Does Israel view Hamas & the PA as legitimate political parties which won their 1994 & 2006 general elections?

As of 2024, Israel has diplomatic ties with 165 of the 192 member states of the United Nations. As of 2022, 28 of the 193 UN member states do not recognise Israeli sovereignty. UN condemnations together with the overreach of international courts who have no jurisdiction over Israel – Chapter VII UN condemnations of Israel, absolutely perceived as a direct threat to Israeli sovereignty and security. Such actions interpreted by Jerusalem as legitimising international intervention or sanctions.

The following 11 countries do not recognise Hamas as a Palestinian government: Israel, Australia, Japan, the US, Canada, Jordan, Egypt, Syria, Brazil, New Zealand, and Britain. It’s important to note that while these countries share a similar stance on the illegitimacy of Hamas and the PA, the exact reasons and the depth of their agreement might vary.

Arab racist nationalism emerged in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, advocating for the independence and unity of Arab peoples, and highly influenced by the 1930s rise of German Nazism hatred against the post WWI Versailles Allied dictated treaty imposed upon defeated Germany.

This ideology often viewed the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine as a threat to Arab identity and territorial claims. Many Arab leaders and intellectuals perceived the Zionist movement as a form of Western colonialism. They argued that Jewish immigration and statehood were imposed by external powers (like Britain and later the United States) at the expense of the indigenous Arab population.

The influx of Jewish immigrants to Palestine raised fears among Arab populations about losing demographic and political control. Arabs in the region worried that a Jewish state would marginalize their rights and status. The 1947 UN Partition Plan, which proposed a division of Palestine into separate Jewish and Arab states, was rejected by Arab leaders. They argued that it was unjust to allocate land to a Jewish state, particularly given the demographic majority of Arabs in the area at the time.

Arab nationalism also emphasized solidarity with Palestinians, viewing the struggle against Zionism as part of a broader Arab struggle against colonialism and for Arab self-determination.

The Arab States absolute refusal to recognize and respect Israeli self-determination has caused Israel in its own right to reject and denounce Gazan, and area A of the PA, based upon the defunct Oslo Accords – to likewise reject the Palestinian right to self-determination. That as of June 2024, 146 of the 193 member states of the UN unilaterally recognize a Palestinian state serves as conclusive proof that these countries oppose direct face to face negotiations between Israel and Arab refugee populations which currently have no country of their own; that these countries seek some international dictate which treats Israel as a protectorate mandate territory. That Israel has no authority to determine its own international borders. That foreign nations, some of which do not even hold diplomatic relations with Israel possess the right and authority to dictate peace terms and borders upon the Jewish people. As if Jews maintain the status of exiles who had to endure the Middle Ages feudalism slanders: the Jews poisoned the wells, killed Christian babies to make matza for Passover, and their ensuing pogroms which culminated in the Shoah – the systematic murder of 75% of European Jewry in less than 3 years.

Israel consequently does not view Hamas or the PA in Samaria as a legitimate political party. The 2006 Palestinian general elections in Gaza and the PA election in Samaria prove nothing. Neither Gaza or the PA in Samaria have held any election thereafter.

Both Hamas and the PA did win a plurality of seats in their respective one-time elections, Israel, along with many other countries, considers both Hamas and the PA as a terrorist organization. This designation stems from Hamas & PA stated goals, which include the destruction of Israel, using “From the River to the Sea” propaganda, as proof of the continued PLO commitment to armed struggle to destroy all Jews.

Therefore, Israel’s refusal to recognize Hamas & PA electoral victories, based on the assessment that Hamas and the PA maintain the original PLO covenant – fundamentally opposed to a peaceful resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The fictional legitimacy of the election results that established both Hamas and the PA as Palestinian “governments”, simply secondary to Israel’s security concerns and its assessment of both Hamas & PA maintenance of the original PLO ideology and actions.

Israel’s stance – heavily influenced by security considerations. Both Hamas and the PA – viewed through the lens of their commitments to armed struggle and hostility toward Israel, seen as direct threats to Israeli self-determination and security. The original PLO covenant, which included objectives against the existence of Israel, continues to shape Israeli perceptions of both Hamas and the PA. Israel argues that these organizations maintain ideologies that are fundamentally opposed to a peaceful resolution of the conflict.

Specifically, which countries agree with Israel that Hamas and the PA together both exist as illegitimate political actors, rooted in the Arab 1948 ideology which absolutely and fundamentally rejects the idea that dhimmi Jews share equal rights to self-determination?

The U.S. designates Hamas as a terrorist organization and has expressed skepticism about the PA’s governance, particularly regarding its effectiveness and commitment to peace. Egypt also views Hamas with suspicion due to its affiliation with the Muslim Brotherhood, which poses a threat to the Egyptian government. Egypt often mediates between Israel and Hamas but does not recognize Hamas as a legitimate actor.

The UAE has taken a more pragmatic approach, normalizing relations with Israel through the Abraham Accords. It views both Hamas and the PA as impediments to peace and stability in the region. While Jordan has a significant Palestinian population and supports Palestinian rights, it is cautious about Hamas due to its radical ideology and the potential for instability it brings to the region. Similar to the UAE, Bahrain and other Gulf states have shown a willingness to engage with Israel and have expressed concerns about the governance and actions of both Hamas and the PA.

Germany, as an EU member state, could potentially break with France over a call for an arms embargo against Israel. Germany and France have different foreign policy priorities and approaches when it comes to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Germany has generally maintained a close relationship with Israel, emphasizing dialogue and cooperation.

Germany could choose not to support a French-led call for an arms embargo against Israel, especially if it perceives such a move as detrimental to Israel’s security or damaging to the relationship between the two countries.

Israel has told António Guterres that he is persona non grata in Israel. Does this preclude the Israeli breakage of all diplomatic relations with the UN and the expulsion of the UN from Lebanon, Gaza, Samaria and Israel?

This status specifically targets Guterres as an individual, meaning, he emphatically – unwelcome in Israel. It does not, as yet extend to the whole of the UN as an organization. However the disgrace and corruption of both UNWRA and UNIFIL does strongly indicate that Israeli distust of the UN has reached a critical breaking point.

The growing frustration with the UN’s effectiveness and its agencies’ actions could indicate that Israel approaches a critical break-point in its tolerance for what it views as inadequate support for its security and sovereignty. While the current measures focus on Guterres, ongoing dissatisfaction could lead to calls for more drastic actions against UN operations in the region. However, such decisions would be complex and could have significant diplomatic repercussions.

Israel’s positioning reflects deep-seated frustrations with the UN and its agencies, particularly in the context of the latest UNGA Chapter VII ultimatum against Israel. Israel often views UNGA resolutions as biased against it, particularly those that criticize its policies in the UN 242 propaganda declaration “occupied territories”. Jordan invaded Israel in the June 1967 war and not the reverse! Resolutions invoking Chapter VII of the UN Charter, which can authorize action to maintain or impose international peace and security – particularly concerning to Jerusalem.

The UNGA most recent issue of a Chapter VII ultimatum which threatens to take actions under Chapter VII, Israel perceives as a direct threat to its sovereignty and security. Such actions interpreted as legitimizing international intervention or sanctions. Israel’s national security simply a paramount concern, and any perceived attack on its legitimacy or actions directly leads to heightened tensions. The Israeli government will respond strongly to what it sees as hostile actions by & from the UN.

Israel’s responses to UN actions can impact its relationships with other nations, especially those that support or oppose UN initiatives. This dynamic may influence diplomatic strategies and alliances in the region. Israel’s complex relationship with Hamas, the PA, and international entities like the UN, driven by deep-seated security concerns and historical grievances which date back to slanders made throughout the Middle Ages. The perspectives of various countries reflect a mix of geopolitical interests, historical ties, and security assessments, leading to a nuanced international landscape regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

War News:

מאגדות אקסטרים (youtube.com) Bibi addresses the Iranian People.

🚨 LIVE: Hamxs Leader KILLED Confirmed As UN Employee – YouTube

Maher al-Assad, the younger brother of Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad, a major general in the Syrian military, as commander of the Syrian Army’s elite 4th Armoured Division, together with Syria’s military intelligence, the core of Syria’s security apparatus, the heart of Syria’s power structure – “killed” by Israeli bombers. Something like the current speculation concerning Sinwar.

He played a central role in Syrian politics for decades. The son of Hafez al-Assad survived by a sister Bushra al-Assad. He Order within the hierarchy of the al-Assad feudal dictatorship/aristocracy: the second-most powerful man in Syria, after his brother Bashar. Bashar inherited the throne when his brother Bassel died in a car accident in 1994. He took over the Presidency in 2000 after Hafez’s passing.

Maher al-Assad, known as “the enforcer”. Had a reputation of ruthlessness and loyalty to the regime. Perhaps the key player in maintaining the regime’s grip on power. The Assad regime not a one-man show. Maher al-Assad managed a network of alliances, interests, and rivalries. The death of Maher’s iron fist directly imperils the Assad dictatorship. Bushra will have to assume the functions of her dead brother. Assassins have already murdered her husband, asef Shawkat, part of the inner circle.

The stability of her influence an open question. Bashar has increasingly asserted his independence from his father’s ‘Old Guard’. Maher’s death likely shall force Bashar to further distance himself from the ‘Old Guard’. Maher, a brutal police figure, the Syrian common man probably shall not mourn his death. Restoking the fires of anti-regime Civil War. Maher’s sudden death undoubtedly sends ripples through the corridors of power in Damascus.

Paris threatens to support Lebanese resistance. A head to head confrontation between French opposition toward Israel. US military bases in Bagdad have come under attack. France has uncorked a resolution at the UN demanding an end to Israel’s occupation of Gaza and the West Bank within a year. It’s based on the International Court of Justice’s advisory opinion, which declared Israel’s presence in those territories unlawful. France, Ireland, Portugal, Spain, and Belgium—all recently practicing their diplomatic pirouettes—supported this resolution.

France condemns Israeli colonization of Balestinian territories (including East Jerusalem), based upon the French Two-State Solution UN 242 Chapter VI “dictate”! US anti-missile defences shot down the katyusha rockets without causing any US casualties. Some 2,500 US troops currently stationed in Iraq.

Game Over

http://valorguardians.com/blog/?p=157879

Game Over. Will Israel invade Lebanon with the purpose to make a mass population transfer & deport all dhimmi Arab refugees living within Gaza to Lebanon; and all dhimmi Arab refugees living within Samaria (Areas A and B of Oslo) to Gaza?

PA the product of the defunct Oslo Accords. Hamas expelled the PNA from Gaza after the 2006 elections. Since 2013 the PNA changed its name to “State of Palestine”. Despite the Hamas electoral victory in 2006 the UN-nations continues to brown nose the PLO as the sole representative of the Palestinian people!

The PA utterly corrupt and detested by Palestinians themselves. The European Two-State dictate “Final Solution” – dead as Hitler. Peace a noun nonsense word. Shalom a verb which requires trust. Post Oct7th Israelis do not trust Arabs.

Since Oslo, Jewish settlers in the West Bank have multiplied—from 110,000 to over 700,000. Perhaps Sinwar navigates tunnels beneath Khan Younis, surrounded by whispers and echoes; but just as likely this Arab rots dead buried in some collapsed tunnel in Khan Younis.

Because Hamas almost totally uprooted and destroyed and the PA in complete and total disgrace the dream of Oslo has proven itself a nightmare. Jerusalem will not permit Hamas rule in Gaza. Nor will it permit the corrupt PA to rule not just Gaza but the Ramallah facade anymore.

The future of Palestinian governance hangs in the balance, and the path forward remains uncertain. Game Over. Will Israel invade Lebanon with the purpose to make a mass population transfer & deport all dhimmi Arab refugees living within Gaza to Lebanon; and all dhimmi Arab refugees living within Samaria (Areas A and B of Oslo) to Gaza?

Israel takes a crap on the toilet and it provokes “significant international backlash”. The international world government confuses UN Chapter VI with UN Chapter VII Korean War dictates! The global community often responds to events in the region based on various political, historical, and humanitarian considerations. This leads to differing interpretations and responses, which can feel frustrating or unjust to Israelis & the BRICS community of Nations. Both consider breaking off all diplomatic relations with the UN-nations.

Many Israelis and their allies feel that international organizations, especially the UN, often focus disproportionately on Israel while overlooking the complexities of the situation, including the actions of Palestinian groups. The BRICS nations (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) have increasingly voiced their discontent with Western-dominated international institutions. Their perspectives on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict often differ from those of Western nations, leading to calls for reform in how global governance operates.

The idea of breaking off diplomatic relations with international bodies like the UN reflects a broader frustration with multilateralism when it is perceived to be ineffective or biased. Such actions could have far-reaching consequences for global diplomacy and conflict resolution. Many nations advocate for reforms in international institutions to better reflect the realities of geopolitical dynamics and ensure fair treatment of all parties involved in conflicts.

In 1970, Jordan expelled the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) from its territory, leading to the organization’s relocation to Lebanon. The PLO had been based in Jordan since the late 1960s, following the 1967 Six-Day War. However, relations between the PLO and Jordan’s King Hussein reached a crisis in September 1970. This was due to the PLO’s open challenge to the king’s control in East Jordan and the hijacking of four international airliners by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), a radical Marxist Palestinian group.

Israel and Lebanon have a long history of conflict, with multiple invasions and occupations by Israel, particularly in the 1980s and 2006. The current tensions between the two countries are rooted in the ongoing conflict between Israel and Hezbollah, a Lebanese Shia group backed by Iran and loosely allied with Hamas.

Egypt and Jordan, which flank Israel on opposite sides and share borders with Gaza and the occupied West Bank, have refused to take in Palestinian refugees from Gaza, citing multiple reasons for rejecting the idea. Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sissi has warned that a mass exodus from Gaza could wreck peace in the region and endanger the two countries’ 40-year-old peace treaty.

The likelihood of Western European countries breaking off diplomatic relations entirely is low, especially during a Trump Administration. While there would be widespread condemnation and significant pressure on Israel, a complete severing of diplomatic ties is a drastic measure. Russia, for example, might be more reluctant to condemn Israel strongly due to its strategic partnership. China might adopt a more neutral stance, prioritizing its economic ties with Israel while publicly expressing concerns about human rights. India and Brazil might take a more balanced approach, condemning the human rights violations while also considering their own national interests.

The presence of a Trump administration (or a similarly populist and less internationally collaborative administration) would indeed complicate the response of Western European countries. A Trump-like administration might be less inclined to strongly condemn Israel, potentially weakening the unified front of Western condemnation. This could embolden Israel and make a coordinated international response more difficult. However, even under such circumstances, individual Western European nations would likely still pursue their own sanctions and diplomatic pressure, albeit perhaps with less coordination. The human rights violations would still be a major concern for many European publics and governments, leading to some level of independent action.

The international response to a hypothetical Israeli invasion and population transfer would be far from uniform. The existence of a less internationally collaborative administration in the US, combined with the diverse national interests within the BRICS nations, would create a fragmented response. While widespread condemnation is likely, the strength and effectiveness of that condemnation would be significantly impacted by these geopolitical factors. The absence of a unified international response would likely embolden Israel.

Iran lacks the sustained logistical and economic capacity for a protracted conflict on the scale of the Vietnam War. Iran’s economy, while relatively large for the region, is significantly smaller than that of the United States during the Vietnam War. Sustaining a major military campaign over many years would place immense strain on its resources and potentially cripple its economy.

Iran’s logistical capabilities are not comparable to those of a global superpower. Maintaining supply lines and providing sustained support for a large military force spread over a wide geographical area would be extremely difficult, especially in the face of potential sanctions and disruptions. Iran’s military doctrine emphasizes asymmetric warfare, utilizing proxies, guerilla tactics, and missile capabilities rather than large-scale conventional warfare. Their military structure is not designed for a prolonged conventional war of attrition.

Iran’s international isolation limits its access to critical resources and technologies needed to sustain a prolonged war effort. Sanctions and restrictions on trade and finance would severely hinder its ability to procure necessary supplies and equipment.

While Iran lacks the capacity for a prolonged, conventional war of attrition on the scale of the Vietnam War, it possesses significant capabilities to wage asymmetric warfare and prolong conflicts through proxies and other means. The statement that Iran lacks the capability for a Vietnam-like war is accurate in the context of a direct, large-scale conventional war but needs qualification when considering Iran’s asymmetric warfare capabilities and potential regional support. A more accurate statement would be that Iran lacks the capacity for a conventional Vietnam-like war, but possesses significant capabilities to prolong conflicts through other means.

A larger conflict could certainly reshape the regional balance of power. Iran possesses a significant military, including a substantial ground force, a robust missile program, and a network of regional proxies. Russia’s entanglement in the Ukraine conflict significantly alters the equation regarding potential international involvement in a larger Middle Eastern war involving Iran. Russia’s deep involvement in the Ukraine war severely limits its capacity to intervene significantly in a separate major conflict in the Middle East. Its military resources are already stretched thin, and diverting substantial forces to a new theater of war would be highly problematic.

Russian intervention would result in the explosion of a third world war! Damascus represents a key strategic asset for Russia in the Middle East. The presence of a Russian military base near Damascus provides Russia with significant military and geopolitical leverage in the region, allowing them to project power and influence in the Eastern Mediterranean and beyond. Losing Damascus would represent a significant loss of this strategic foothold. A major escalation in Syria could indirectly impact the Ukraine war. If Russia were forced to divert resources to Syria, it could weaken its position in Ukraine and potentially affect the outcome of the conflict. Russia’s restraint to prevent the fall of Damascus – a highly plausible one.