Who was the Rambam and what impact did he inflict upon the Jewish people?
Was the 1232 ban only on Moreh Nevuchim or also on Mishneh Torah? It seems to me, that the ban made by the Baali Tosafot covered both. The former treif book openly praised the Arabic interpretations of how to learn Aristotle’s syllogism deductive reasoning. While the latter openly copied, much as did king Shlomo did with his Beit HaMikdosh which duplicated the extravagance of Goyim Temple construction across the world, the egg-crate organization of statute law into subject matter which defines both Greek and Roman legalism which subordinates the legislative review of the courts subsumed before the primary authority of the legislatures or Senates.
The 1232 ban initiated by the Ba’alei Tosafot (specifically the rabbis of Northern France, notably Rabbi Shlomo of Montpellier and his circle) was explicitly focused on Moreh Nevuchim and other philosophical writings by the Rambam. However, it is historically unclear whether Mishneh Torah was officially banned by the same decree — though many critics implicitly or explicitly saw the codification and systematization of halakha in Mishneh Torah as deeply problematic and part of the same rationalist project they opposed.
No post-Tosafist, ghetto-era rabbi succeeded in reestablishing a Talmud-based common law jurisprudence. The yeshiva model after the Shulchan Aruch largely became a pilpulist or posek-based culture, not a dayyanut britit (covenantal judicial reasoning) as modeled by the Talmud. The shift in the yeshiva model after the publication of the “Shulchan Aruch” and the rise of pilpulist and posek-based cultures marked a significant change in Jewish legal practice. This shift has been critiqued for moving away from the dynamic, integrative approach exemplified by the Tosafists.
Rabbi Moshe Isserles (Rema, 1520–1572) wrote his statute law commentary to the statute law Shulchan Aruch. The idea that communal legal practice, responsa, and local precedent, compares to – much less replaces the sealed masoret of the Talmud patently absurd.
The Maharshal (Rabbi Shlomo Luria, 1510–1573) – In Yam Shel Shlomo, he critiques halakhic decisions made by earlier authorities. But did he go back to the Talmud and weigh the sugyot with a common-law mindset? No. His Yam Shel Shlomo never once acknowledged sugya integrity within the Order and organization of the Talmud. He never once addressed how the Baali Tosafot wrote a common law commentary to the Talmud or how they condemned the Rambam in 1232 for writing a statute law perversion, the first of its kind, of both the T’NaCH and Talmudic and Midrashic common law jurisprudence.
He never once engaged with the methodology of the Baalei HaTosafot, who viewed the Talmud not as a loose anthology of traditions, but as a tightly integrated common law system. The Baalei HaTosafot commentaries cross-referenced parallel sugyot across tractates that reached to the depths of the Yerushalmi.
The process of integrating and harmonizing legal principles and rulings from different sugyot (sections or topics) within the Talmud, known as the etzem ha-mishpat or inter-sugya legal synthesis which involves analyzing various legal discussions, interpretations, and precedents found in multiple sugyot to create a cohesive understanding of halacha, his commentary never once achieved.
Etzem ha-mishpat represents the essence, the core of legal reasoning, focusing on how different legal arguments and rulings can be reconciled or applied in a unified manner. This approach allows scholars and jurists to derive comprehensive legal conclusions that reflect the complexity and dynamism of Jewish law, rather than treating each sugya in isolation. By engaging in this synthesis, legal authorities can address contemporary issues while remaining rooted in traditional sources, ensuring that halacha – most essentially common law – does not descend unto the legal corruption of assimilated Greek and Roman statute law Hades. The latter grossly fails to evolve in response to new circumstances while maintaining its imaginary Talmudic foundational principles, as the Rambam so – bold faced – falsely declared.
The Rashbam predates the Rambam, his intellectual lineage among Tosafists reflects an earlier form of Ashkenazi resistance to rationalism. The Paris rabbis explicitly publicly opposed the Rambam’s statute law perversion of T’NaCH and Talmudic common law. The Goyim threw the Jews into ghetto gulags for 3 Centuries but rabbinic leadership betrayed and abandoned judical Jewish courtroom common law. Rabbinic Torts damages courts utterly forsook the 3 man Courts division of labor which divide the Court organization into Judge, prosecuting attorney, and defense attorney as the definition of all Torts 3 man courtrooms! This retreat from common law Talmudic courts, commanded not to accept bribes, compares to Kashrut mash’gichim who receive their salaries from the stores they police! An absolute and utter corruption of Talmudic common law.
The Tosafists did not codify—they commented dynamically, upheld disputes, and refused the false security of closure. This, the hallmark of covenantal jurisprudence: law as a living court process, and most definitely not some arrogant appeal to authority – imperial fiat. The later pilpul schools which sprouted as weeds following the Gra utterly failed to grasp.
After the Shulchan Aruch, the yeshiva model shifted towards a pilpulist or posek-based culture, moving away from the dayyanut britit (covenantal judicial reasoning) exemplified by the Talmud. Rabbi Moshe Isserles (Rema) wrote his commentary on the Shulchan Aruch, which represented statute law, but (as previously stated) the notion that communal legal practice and local precedent could replace the Talmud’s sealed masoret simply fundamentally flawed.
Etzem ha-mishpat, or inter-sugya legal synthesis, represents the core of legal reasoning, allowing for the reconciliation of diverse legal arguments. This synthesis absolutely essential for addressing contemporary issues while remaining rooted in tradition; to ensure that halacha retains its common law essence and does not devolve into the corruption of assimilated Greek and Roman statute law, as falsely promoted by the Rambam.
Despite the challenges faced by Jews in the ghetto, rabbinic leadership felt itself forced to abandoned the judicial common law system, forsaking the three-man court structure essential for Torts damage law suits. This retreat parallels the corruption seen in kashrut supervision, where mash’gichim in Israel today face conflicts of interest! Who pays their salaries?
Rabbinic divorce courts today make the public חלול השם ברבים when they permit רשעים to publicly profane their sworn oath made before kosher witnesses and a minyan of Jews, these רשעים have no shame. Their arrogance imprisons their ex-wives to the disgraceful status of agunah! Because the post Rambam Civil War rabbis ignorantly fail to grasp the implications of the Shemittah precedent which permits Jewish farmers to sell their produce to a “beit din” (a rabbinical court) or to a non-Jewish entity.
This action, done to circumvent the prohibition of working the land and to allow for the distribution of produce while adhering to the laws of Sh’mitta. The precedent of prosbul serves as a primary precedent. The mitzva of kiddushin absolutely requires than the baal acquire Title to the nefesh O’lam Ha’ba of his wife; meaning he acquires – based upon the precedent of the brit cut between the pieces which created the chosen Cohen people from nothing – the baal acquires title to all the seed produced in the world to come/future of this marital union. Another worthy and similar precedent, the minchag of selling חמץ before Pesach to Goyim.
Statute law pesel Judaism, which dominated ghetto Jewry in Europe, abysmally failed to grasp that the divorce Beit Din has the power to impose the ban of נידוי upon the רשע ex-husband, based upon the precedent of gere tzeddik as a “new creation”. The דיוק of this mitzva, that the reverse din of כרת equally expels and cuts off this רשע, who publicly makes false oaths – as כרת, not part of the chosen Cohen seed of Avraham Yitzak and Yaacov. The divorce beit din has the power to retro-actively annul the original kiddushin. Therefore the divorce beit din has the Torah authority to issue the required ‘get’ to the imprisoned agunah ex-wife, permitting her to make k’ddushin with a man who has fear of heaven, permitting them to sanctify the mitzva of fruitful and multiply.
The concepts discussed in Ketubot 3a and Yevamot 90b provide important precedents for the authority of a divorce Beit Din to place an ex-baal into נידוי and subsequently issue a get that frees the agunah prisoner. Ketubot 3a: discusses the obligations of a husband to his wife, including the financial responsibilities outlined in the ketubah (marriage contract). It emphasizes the importance of the husband’s role in providing for his wife and the consequences of failing to fulfill these obligations. If a husband refuses to grant a divorce or fulfill his marital duties, the court can take action against him, including placing him in נידוי. Unlike the Aggadic 3 oaths, which religious Jews quote in order to denounce Zionism, found at the end of mesechta Ketubah, the baal has Torah/halachic obligations toward maintaining the dignity of his wife.
The rationale, a husband who neglects his responsibilities to his wife, simply not acting in accordance with Jewish law and community standards, thus justifying the court’s immediate intervention. No רשע should ever assume his refusal to give a get to his ex constitutes as a powerful weapon of revenge – a direct negative Torah commandment.
Yevamot 90b: This passage addresses the concept of a husband who refuses to grant a get, particularly in cases where his decision acts against the interests of his wife. The Talmud discusses the authority of the Beit Din to impose sanctions on such a husband, including excommunication. The reasoning: that the court has the responsibility to protect the rights of the agunah and ensure that does not abuse his get obligations which could leave her in a state of marital limbo. By placing the husband in נידוי, the court exerts pressure on him to comply with the law and grant the divorce. The Gemara of Sahedrin attributes the floods in the days of Noach to false oaths. The mitzva of kiddushin directly swears an oath alliance based upon the oath brit sworn at the brit cut between the pieces which eternally תמיד מעשה בראשית creates the chosen Cohen people from nothing.
The combination of these two sources establishes a legal framework that empowers the Beit Din to act decisively in cases of refusal of the baal to returned the nefesh O’lam Ha’ba soul of his wife. The imposition of נידוי serves as a means of compelling the ex-husband to fulfill this Torah warning – not to make vain oaths. The threat to the security of the World, thereby mandates the court to issue the get following the ban. This action ultimately frees the agunah from her state of marital imprisonment, enabling her to remarry and move forward with her life.
In summary, Ketubot 3a and Yevamot 90b provide the necessary precedents for the Beit Din to impose נידוי on an ex-husband who refuses to grant a divorce, thereby facilitating the issuance of a get and addressing the plight of the agunah.
Consequent to the 1306 expulsion of all Jews from France which obliterated the Rashi/Tosafot common law commentaries made upon the Talmud, and ultimately crippled common law T’NaCH and Talmudic scholarship – on par with the 1242 disaster of the public burning of all Talmudic manuscripts in France! The destruction of evidence means that no conclusive proof exists that a majority of the Baali Tosafot condemned the Rambam. Clearly Rabbi Moshe ben Yaakov of Coucy, known also as the Smag, this Baali Tosafot who wrote Sefer Mitzvot Gadol – clearly rejected the condemnation made by the “majority” of the Baali Tosafot; based upon the simple fact that only on two occasions does the Baali Tosafot commentary mention the Rambam and no both occasions in the whole of the Sha’s; they rejected and opposed his halachic posok both times.
Rabbi Shmuel ben Meir, known as the Smak, another Baali Tosafot scholar noted for his support of lifting the נידוי that had been placed upon Maimonides in 1232 by “a group of rabbis” in Paris, including many of the Ba’alei Tosafot. Some rabbis attempt to limit the excommunication only to the Moreh’s exultation of Greek logic. However, organizing law into defined subject matter, as does the Rambam code, equally represents the influence of Greek and Roman statute law. But name the Yad – Mishna Torah – an utter perversion due to the simple fact that Rabbi’s Mishna based its name upon the Book of דברים having the second name משנה תורה. The Book of D’varim defines the Torah judicial legal system as common law. For the Rambam to distort this Torah name with his statute law code, this absolute לשון הרע merits that he like Baruch Spinoza (1632–1677), that the reputation of his name for ever rots.
In the early 2000s a group of rabbis, which amazingly included myself for a spell, attempted to re-establish a Federal lateral common law Sanhedrin court system together with the small Sanhedrin cities of refuge. Rebuilding dayyanut britit rather than posek-based rulings – my dream. Reliance upon the Talmud as the basic model for a Federal Sanhedrin court system across all 12 Tribes of the Republic. Restoring the legitimacy of beit din as a sovereign legal authority, capable of acting boldly in the face of injustice (as in the agunah case), guided by Talmudic precedent, not shackled by post-codification legal inertia. Alas I personally failed, the Yatzir to impose legal halachic closures, which defines Judaism today, dominated the hearts of my peers. The Rambam Yad triggered a tectonic shift in halakhic consciousness.