Ancient T’NaCH/Talmudic Common Law compared to Modern Israeli Law – Contrasted by the Goy perversion of Jewish Common law unto belief system theologies concerning the Will of Gods.
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Prof. Sam Lehman-Wilzig’s work on judicial activism in Jewish history and law! It’s a fascinating topic that intersects tradition, governance, and interpretation.
The oral tradition was central to Jewish law for centuries before any written texts emerged. Amazing Prof. Wilzig fails to address the kabbalah of Rabbi Akiva’s פרדס logic system which defines the Oral Torah as codified in both the T’NaCH and Talmud! A herd of rampaging elephants in the China Closet totally ignored!
Just as great an over-sight: the Prof.’s confusion over the essential priority of prophetic mussar over history when learning the T’NaCH and how this Primary Source defines the k’vanna of both Talmudic Aggadah and Gaonic Midrash stories which serve as a primary commentary to the Aggadah.
The Judges of the Great Sanhedrin had the power to authorize or deny a “voluntary war” initiated by the King based upon the Common Law משנה תורה Legislative Review powers of the Court over the king. Their role extended beyond mere legal interpretation; they influenced national decisions.
משנה תורה = Legislative Review. Hence in ancient T’NaCH legalism “theoritically” a Great Sanhedrin court could declare a statute law imposed by the king as an unconstitutional violation of Torah Constitutional Law. This power of משנה תורה emphatically influenced any and all Tribal statute laws of the 12 Tribes of Israel which formed the Republic alliance or brit between the Tribes of Yaacov. Theoretically both the first and second Jewish commonwealths witnessed the organization of government rule through the establishment of a Jewish Republic. Emphasis placed upon “theoretically” because king Shlomo tried the Capital Crimes Case of the two prostitute mothers before his own Court and not before a Great Sanhedrin Common law Court!
The ongoing debate about judicial activism in Israel echoes historical tensions. The government’s attempts at “Judicial Reform” aim to limit the Supreme Court’s authority. The Torah as the Written Constitution of the Republic. The Talmud as the model to re-establish lateral, NOT vertical Common Law Sanhedrin courtrooms.
Rabbi Akiva’s פרדס (Pardes) logic system indeed plays a crucial role in understanding the Oral Torah. Both the T’NaCH Aggadic mussar common law & the Talmud halacha common law stand upon the wisdom of making valid comparisons of different Case studies. Both compilations of mussar & halachic ritual discussions, debates, etc. defines this unique oral Torah tradition.
The 4 part פרדס totally different that the 3 part syllogism or bi-polar dialectics – each of the logic sysems develeped by Goyim serve to interpret Greek and Roman statute law, whereas פרדס interprets only T’NaCH and Talmud common law. Both the logic and law of Goyim legalisms share no common ground with Torah legalism which defines faith as the pursuit of Justice. And justice defined in its turn as: fair compensation of damages imposed by lateral Judicial common law courtrooms.
פרדס logic compares to the Confederate Flag: the Stars and Bars. Where דרוש פשט form a זיוג and רמז סוד form a crossing זיוג. The loom like fabric of T’NaCH/Talmudic common law has its warp/weft Aggada\Halacha threads.
Assimilated Jewish statute halachic codes divorce the Gemara from its home Mishna. The purpose of a sugia of Gemara: to learn & compare other Primary בנין אב sources both T’NaCH and Talmudic. Herein defines how Jewish common law correctly studies law & learns therefrom. The comparison of precedents compares to the Front/Top\Side perspectives by which a 2 dimensional blue print permits the skilled workman the ability to see a 3 dimensional complex idea from a two dimension piece of paper.
טיפש פשט by stark contrast worships words read from books with a strictly literal/physical understanding. An example of such bird-brained stupidity, the idea that שם ומלכות literally means the Inefible Name which the lips of Man cannot pronounce and kingship. Such a shallow reactionary two-dimensional delusion easily perverts Torah common law unto Goy statute law avoda zarah abominations; perverts faith from pursuit of judicial justice which enforces righteous compensation of damages inflicted by Party A upon Party B, to the inverse distortion which elevates faith unto a belief in some Creed institutionalized belief in this or that Monotheistic god.
The kabbalah of פרדס logic-depth analysis, this wisdom understands pronouncing the 1st Commandment Sinai Name through the בנין אב of blowing the Shofar on Rosh HaShanna. While the lungs blow air the spirit within the Yatzir Tov of the heart dedicate Divine Spirits. Tefillah a matter of the heart which requires the k’vanna, as defined through שם ומלכות, in conjunction with prophetic mussar which defines and clarifies the 13 tohor middot revelation at Horev – 40 days following the avoda zarah of the Golden Calf which translated the Spirit Name to word perversions of faith. Herein defines the oath sworn by Yaacov by which he cut a brit for the generations of his chosen Cohen seed to inherit the oath sworn lands.
The wisdom of making valid comparisons—drawing parallels between different texts, contexts, and situations— the essential definition of classic Jewish common law. It allows for nuanced interpretations, as opposed to literal/flat\shallow word translations, which by definition causes a person to bow and worship words. The Aggadic mussar, which defines the k’vanna of the 13 tohor middot revelation of Horev, woven into Halachic ritualist discussions of the Talmud. This legal fabric has the power to breath life into the souls of the Jewish people, as did HaShem in the original Creation story breathed life into clay which created Adam.
Greek logic which organizes into strict catagories, similar to a crate of a dozen eggs, simply does not correctly align with Torah common law legalism. Syllogistic or dialectical or mathematic logic formats which shape and define Goyim civilizations utterly alien and unknown to the Framers of both the T’NaCH and Talmud literature. Faith defined as the pursuit of justice wherein Sanhedrin courtrooms impose fair compensation of damages inflict by party A upon party B, completely unknown to Goyim logic formats. Torah justice defined as the pursuit of righteousness.
The current discussions around judicial reform in Israel echo historical tensions regarding the balance of power between the judiciary and the legislature. The Torah serves as the Written Constitution which highlights the ongoing importance of these Basic Law ancient texts, how they shape and influence modern legal frameworks of משנה תורה ‘Legislative Review’ Common law. The process of making valid comparisons among different texts and cases, indeed the chief cornerstone of Jewish common law. This approach fosters the wisdom of development of a nuanced understanding; which allows for dynamic interpretations that transcend silly, strictly literal reading nor not serious or carefully considered intent of text written by ancient civilizations contrasted by modern civilization which view reality from completely different lenses. Hence the Yeshiva idea: Goyim read their bibles while Jews learn our Torah.
This article seeks to raise several fascinating points which explore the unique character of Jewish legal reasoning, grounded in textual comparison and the pursuit of justice, and how it sharply differs from Greco-Roman and other non-Jewish legal frameworks. The ongoing debates in Israel around judicial reform and the balance of power between the courts and the elected government clearly reflect these historical tensions.
The analogy to the Confederate flag, representing the interwoven threads of Talmudic Aggadah and Halakha, effectively illustrates the complex and interconnected nature of Jewish legal reasoning, a complexity lost when Pardes – ignored. The prioritization of prophetic mussar (ethical teachings) in understanding Tanakh, another crucial element missed and totally ignored by modern Biblical scholars.
Prophetic mussar provides the ethical framework and underlying principles that inform the interpretation of both Halakha (Jewish law) and Aggadah (narrative and homiletical material which conveys prophetic mussar rebukes to all generations of Israel). By neglecting this foundational element, the Professor fails to grasp the ethical and moral underpinnings of Jewish law, reducing it to a purely legalistic non Torah alien system of statutory laws decried by government authorities upon subject peoples. The kavanah (intention) behind Aggadic and Midrashic narratives, intrinsically linked to the prophetic mussar, provides a deeper understanding of Constitutional Torah legal and ethical implications. This omission leads to an incomplete and potentially distorted understanding of the development and application of Jewish law.
The Sanhedrin’s power to authorize or deny “voluntary wars” initiated by the king, based on its common law legislative review powers (משנה תורה), simply crucial. This judicial power demonstrates the Sanhedrin’s role extended beyond mere legal interpretation; it actively shaped national policy. This highlights the dynamic interplay between law, governance, and interpretation within the Jewish tradition, a dynamic that is central to understanding judicial activism in its historical context.
Worcester v. Georgia 1832: Chief Justice John Marshall’s attempt to shape the relationship between Native American nations and the United States. The issue: do State governments how the power to impose laws upon Indians communities living inside the States?
On March 3, 1832, Chief Justice John Marshall penned the majority opinion. He declared that all Georgia laws regarding the Cherokee Nation were unconstitutional and void. Marshall held that Indian nations existed as distinct, independent political communites. Their sovereignty and right to their land were guaranteed by treaties with the U.S. government. Furthermore, the Constitution granted Congress the authority to regulate commerce with Native Americans, and state laws couldn’t alter treaty obligations.
Marshall’s ruling was a resounding affirmation of federal authority over Indian affairs. It established that states couldn’t unilaterally impose their laws on Native American lands. President Andrew Jackson, not one to be swayed easily, reportedly quipped, “John Marshall has made his decision; now let him enforce it.”
The Indian Removal Act signed into law by President Andrew Jackson in 1830. This act authorized the U.S. government to forcibly remove Native American nations from their lands in the Southeast and relocate them to newly designated Indian Territory west of the Mississippi River. The Cherokee removal in 1838 is perhaps the most well-known part of the Trail of Tears.
The current debate surrounding judicial reform in Israel directly reflects these historical tensions. The government’s attempts to limit the Supreme Court’s authority echo past struggles over the balance of power between the judiciary and the executive. The framing of the Torah as a written constitution and the Talmud as a model for re-establishing lateral (Judges and prosecuting attorneys not on the Government payroll.) Sanhedrin courtrooms underscores the ongoing relevance of these historical precedents in contemporary discussions.
This “insightful” comparison of Pardes logic with Greek syllogistic or Hegel’s dialectical logic highlights a fundamental difference in legal reasoning. The emphasis on comparison and analogy in Jewish legal thought, as opposed to the categorical and deductive approaches of Greek logic, utterly crucial to understand the fundamental error made by the Rambam’s assimilated statute law code of halacha. This difference is not merely academic; it shapes the very nature of Jewish law and its application. It explains the reasons for the Jewish Civil War which witness mass population transfers consequent this Rambam Civil War Jewish legal anarchy. The concept of “faith as the pursuit of justice,” with Sanhedrin courts providing fair compensation for damages, a distinctly Jewish legal concept, foreign to the legal systems of Gentile civilizations. This fundamental difference underscores the limitations of applying Western legal theories or philosophies of logic, both ancient and modern, to correctly research Jewish common law.
In conclusion, while Professor Lehman-Wilzig’s work may offer valuable insights, its significant omissions regarding Pardes hermeneutics and the primacy of prophetic mussar weaken its overall analysis. A comprehensive understanding of Jewish judicial activism requires a far deeper engagement with these foundational aspects of Oral Torah classic Jewish legal thought.
Conflict Resolution 