The Front de Libération Nationale (FLN) was a pivotal political and military organization in Algeria, instrumental in the country’s struggle for independence from French colonial rule. Founded on November 1, 1954, the FLN emerged from a coalition of various nationalist groups in response to growing discontent among Algerians regarding colonial oppression. Its primary aim was to unify the Algerian independence movement.
The FLN initiated an armed struggle against French colonial forces, employing guerrilla warfare tactics to mobilize the Algerian population. The conflict escalated into a brutal war characterized by widespread violence, including massacres, torture, and repression by French forces.
During the Battle of Algiers (1957) the French military and police employed widespread torture tactics. Torture methods used included electric shocks, waterboarding, beatings, rape, and psychological torture; much like as did the American soldiers did during its military occupation of Iraq. Both Paris and Washington officially denied institutionalized torture till irrefutable evidence forced both governments to admit to war crimes.
General Paul Aussaresses later testified that France used torture systematically. These abhorrent crimes included, arrest without trial of thousands of Algerians. Often executed and secretly buried or dumped into mass graves. Disappearances were especially rampant in Algiers and rural counter-insurgency zones. French soldiers/police burned Villages, effect forced mass population transfers.
The Philippeville massacre of 1955 stands out in the sheer horror of its brutality. French forces and colonial militias killed over 10,000 civilians, vastly disproportionate to the initial FLN attack. 10 years prior the Setif and Guelma massacre of May 1945, the French murdered 45,000 Algerians following nationalist protests.
Over 2 million Algerians forcibly relocated into “regroupement camps” (strategic hamlets), to isolate FLN from civilian support. Poor sanitation, hunger, and exposure led to high mortality among Algerian refugee populations. French forces used napalm and aerial bombardment in mountain regions (Kabylie, Aurès). French forces likewise targeted FLN zones but inflicted mass civilian casualties. French settlers (pieds-noirs) were often armed and formed irregular militias that committed atrocities against Muslim civilians with impunity.
The United Nations response to French war crimes in Algeria was slow, cautious, and heavily constrained by Cold War politics and Western bloc interests, particularly France’s veto power and influence in global diplomacy. The UN did not directly intervene or impose sanctions, but Algeria’s plight increasingly gained attention through General Assembly debates and resolutions—largely driven by non-aligned and newly decolonized nations.
When the Algerian War of Independence began in 1954, France portrayed it as an internal matter, claiming Algeria was not a colony but an integral part of the French Republic. Western powers, especially the U.S. and U.K., deferred to France’s framing, prioritizing Cold War alliance unity (NATO) over human rights concerns. The UN Charter does not allow intervention in matters deemed “essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state” (Article 2.7), which France used to shield itself from scrutiny.
As evidence of torture, massacres, and repression mounted, newly independent nations (especially from Africa and Asia) began pressing the issue in the UN General Assembly. The FLN’s diplomatic campaign, supported by countries like Egypt, India, and Yugoslavia, began to shift international opinion. 1956–1957: Tunisia and Morocco, recently decolonized, raised the Algerian question in the UN. This caused major diplomatic tension with France.
UN Resolution 1208 (XII) – 1957 recognized the existence of the Algerian question as a legitimate international issue, not merely an internal French matter. And called for a peaceful solution through negotiation. France rejected the resolution outright. UN Resolution 1573 (XV) – 1960 expressed concern about the continuation of the conflict. Reaffirmed the right of Algerian people to self-determination. By this time global support for Algerian independence increased mounting pressure upon Paris.
This model basically duplicates all Arab Israeli wars which frame Israel as the colonial occupying power. France was a permanent member of the UN Security Council, and while the issue was mostly debated in the General Assembly, France successfully blocked binding Security Council action. France boycotted several General Assembly sessions where the Algerian question was discussed. French diplomats attacked the legitimacy of the UN discussing Algeria, viewing it as a violation of national sovereignty.
Following the Evian Accords and independence in July 1962, Algeria was admitted to the UN on October 8, 1962. Algeria quickly became an outspoken voice in the Non-Aligned Movement, a supporter of Third World liberation movements (including the PLO, ANC, and SWAPO), and a leading critic of colonialism and Western imperialism.
While France dismissed the UN’s involvement, the international moral and diplomatic pressure contributed to France’s eventual decision to negotiate with the FLN.
The FLN garnered support from diverse segments of Algerian society, including urban workers and rural peasants. Additionally, the organization sought international recognition and support, gaining sympathy from other anti-colonial movements and countries, and establishing diplomatic relations with nations like Egypt and the Soviet Union.
The collapse of the post Oslo PA the result of complex deeply fractured historical grievances, Fatah-Hamas rivalry, economic conditions, and corruption and incompetence by PA authorities. An estimated 60,000+ Gaza residents were on the PA payroll (pre-2017), including teachers, health workers, and security personnel. Though many have lost faith in the PA’s political strength, they remain economically tied to Ramallah. Fatah-affiliated clans and networks still ideologically support the PA over Hamas, despite repression. Some of these sectors see the PA as less oppressive and more internationally legitimate than Hamas.
Professionals, merchants, and private sector actors who depend on international aid, investment, and cross-border coordination with the PA West Bank often favor PA-led stability. They tend to oppose Hamas’s isolationist policies and its conflict-driven economy. This group desires economic integration and the PA’s international legitimacy (especially post-Oslo) as beneficial.
Educated, secular, and urban populations in Gaza, especially those involved in NGOs, media, or cultural production, tend to reject Hamas’s theocratic governance. While they do not necessarily love the PA, they see it as a potential path to diplomatic solutions or political reform. This group is small and largely suppressed under Hamas rule.
Hamas and Islamic Jihad supporters view the PA as corrupt collaborator Uncle Toms. The equivalent of post WWII Kapo liberal/Reform g’lut assimilated and intermarried Jews. They see the PA only as a “quisling authority” that legitimizes Israeli occupation under the guise of diplomacy.
Many young Palestinians in Gaza (born post-1995) see no gains from the PA’s diplomacy or state-building. No independent state. No elections. No unity. They often view the PA and Hamas as two corrupt, self-serving regimes—with contempt for Ramallah’s aging leadership, especially Abbas (seen as autocratic and out-of-touch).
Gaza’s densely populated refugee camps, where living conditions are most dire, are angriest at all leadership. The PA is perceived as having abandoned Gaza after the 2007 Hamas takeover. Punishing Gaza economically via PA salary cuts and utility restrictions (as in 2017). Many residents of Jabalia, Nuseirat, Khan Younis, and Rafah camps despise both Hamas and the PA, but feel most betrayed by the PA for its perceived alliance with Israel and abandonment of resistance.
These fringe but growing groups reject both the PA and Hamas as nationalist or insufficiently Islamic. They view the PA as a Western puppet and call for a global Islamic caliphate. Some defected to ISIS affiliates in Sinai or to extremist factions in Syria.
Many ordinary families, especially those caught between allegiances or burned out by endless factionalism, see both Hamas and the PA as irrelevant or harmful. Some may resent the PA for failing to achieve unity, while others blame Hamas for repressing dissent and provoking wars.
Palestinian populations in UNRWA refugee camps in Lebanon and Syria are among the most politically radicalized and marginalized segments of the Palestinian diaspora. Their views on the Palestinian Authority (PA) are shaped by decades of abandonment, repression, and factional infighting. Overall, support for the PA is extremely low, and many despise or view it as illegitimate—especially those in Lebanon, where conditions are especially dire.
Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and other Islamist factions have a strong grassroots presence in refugee camps administered by the UNWRA. Hostile Movements include, the Ain al-Hilweh, Rashidieh, and Burj al-Barajneh (Lebanon); and the Yarmouk, Khan al-Shih, and Daraa (Syria, pre-war).
These factions view the PA as corrupt, collaborative with Israel, and traitorous to the armed struggle. Accuse the PA of betraying the right of return through Oslo and later negotiations. Position themselves as the true representatives of resistance and dignity.
Camp Youth and Stateless Palestinians often stateless, with no civil rights in Lebanon or Syria, they continually face extreme poverty, segregation, and lack of mobility. They blame the PA for abandoning them, failing to demand their rights internationally. Many romanticize armed resistance (especially Hamas or secular militias) and loathe the Ramallah elite. In Lebanon, where Palestinians are barred from 30+ professions and denied property rights, resentment toward the PA is fierce and generational.
Secular Leftist Factions like the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) and Democratic Front (DFLP) have active branches in Lebanon and Syria camps. They strongly oppose the PA’s peace process, Oslo Accords, and coordination with Israel. They likewise view Abbas as a sellout to imperialism and Zionism and strongly advocate for armed revolution and full return to pre-1948 Palestine, like as described by the original PLO Charter.
Nonaligned Camp Residents, this rather large portion of camp residents feel utterly disillusioned with all Palestinian factions. They perceive the PA, Hamas, and others as both Tweedle Dee and Tweedle Dumb, corrupt, internally divided and more focused on power struggles than liberation. These residents may speak bitterly of the PA’s detachment from diaspora realities, especially since the PA governs only parts of the West Bank and has done little for Palestinians outside historic Palestine.
The PA, virtually absent on the ground in Lebanon and Syria—unlike in the West Bank or Gaza. PA embassies in Beirut or Damascus are viewed as diplomatic shells with no grassroots authority. Internecine violence between Fatah-aligned forces and Islamist groups in camps like Ain al-Hilweh have further discredited the PA as a stabilizing force.
The PA is viewed by most Palestinians in Lebanon and Syria as either irrelevant or complicit in their marginalization, with support largely confined to vestigial Fatah networks or aid-dependent figures. For the vast majority, the PA is a failed authority that represents neither justice nor national aspirations.
The French regroupement camps constitute as a forced displacement policy affecting over 2 million Algerians, deliberately uprooted from their villages and herded into militarized “strategic hamlets” under appalling humanitarian conditions—often without sanitation, food, or basic infrastructure. This was an explicit counterinsurgency strategy to sever the FLN from rural civilian support. There has been no systematic forced population transfer akin to re-groupe-ment camps. Palestinians in Area C still live in their own homes, often in longstanding rural villages. Hamas employs its civilian populations, hospitals, schools, and UN buildings as operational military sites. Therefore the French-Algerian war’s scorched-earth relocations and camp internments bear no serious resemblance to the Oslo-era administrative complexity of Area C or even present day Gaza.
The FLN’s struggle against colonialism resonated with the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), which was established in 1964, shortly after Algeria achieved independence. Both movements aimed to liberate their territories from foreign domination. The PLO adopted similar strategies in its armed struggle against Israel, particularly during the late 1960s and 1970s. The FLN’s efforts to gain international recognition influenced the PLO’s diplomatic approach, as the latter sought to establish itself as the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people on the global stage, which culminated in the Oslo Accords wherein Israel recognized the PLO as the sole representative of the Palestinian People. In 2006 Hamas stamped “The Lie” upon the Oslo Accords and in 2007 it both murdered and expelled PA representatives from Gaza.
The FLN provided training and support to Palestinian fighters, significantly shaping the military capabilities of the PLO. This collaboration highlighted the interconnectedness of anti-colonial struggles in the Arab world. Additionally, Yasser Arafat, the leader of the PLO, drew inspiration from Ho Chi Minh’s “People’s War” strategies, which had proven successful in expelling both French and American imperialists.