Ancient T’NaCH/Talmudic Common Law compared to Modern Israeli Law – Contrasted by the Goy perversion of Jewish Common law unto belief system theologies concerning the Will of Gods.

https://api.follow.it/track-rss-story-click/v3/M8X-A1uQfqXPRBrWhiodx7JXeTvhTWzl

Prof. Sam Lehman-Wilzig’s work on judicial activism in Jewish history and law! It’s a fascinating topic that intersects tradition, governance, and interpretation.

The oral tradition was central to Jewish law for centuries before any written texts emerged. Amazing Prof. Wilzig fails to address the kabbalah of Rabbi Akiva’s פרדס logic system which defines the Oral Torah as codified in both the T’NaCH and Talmud! A herd of rampaging elephants in the China Closet totally ignored!

Just as great an over-sight: the Prof.’s confusion over the essential priority of prophetic mussar over history when learning the T’NaCH and how this Primary Source defines the k’vanna of both Talmudic Aggadah and Gaonic Midrash stories which serve as a primary commentary to the Aggadah.

The Judges of the Great Sanhedrin had the power to authorize or deny a “voluntary war” initiated by the King based upon the Common Law משנה תורה Legislative Review powers of the Court over the king. Their role extended beyond mere legal interpretation; they influenced national decisions.

משנה תורה = Legislative Review. Hence in ancient T’NaCH legalism “theoritically” a Great Sanhedrin court could declare a statute law imposed by the king as an unconstitutional violation of Torah Constitutional Law. This power of משנה תורה emphatically influenced any and all Tribal statute laws of the 12 Tribes of Israel which formed the Republic alliance or brit between the Tribes of Yaacov. Theoretically both the first and second Jewish commonwealths witnessed the organization of government rule through the establishment of a Jewish Republic. Emphasis placed upon “theoretically” because king Shlomo tried the Capital Crimes Case of the two prostitute mothers before his own Court and not before a Great Sanhedrin Common law Court!

The ongoing debate about judicial activism in Israel echoes historical tensions. The government’s attempts at “Judicial Reform” aim to limit the Supreme Court’s authority. The Torah as the Written Constitution of the Republic. The Talmud as the model to re-establish lateral, NOT vertical Common Law Sanhedrin courtrooms.

Rabbi Akiva’s פרדס (Pardes) logic system indeed plays a crucial role in understanding the Oral Torah. Both the T’NaCH Aggadic mussar common law & the Talmud halacha common law stand upon the wisdom of making valid comparisons of different Case studies. Both compilations of mussar & halachic ritual discussions, debates, etc. defines this unique oral Torah tradition.

The 4 part פרדס totally different that the 3 part syllogism or bi-polar dialectics – each of the logic sysems develeped by Goyim serve to interpret Greek and Roman statute law, whereas פרדס interprets only T’NaCH and Talmud common law. Both the logic and law of Goyim legalisms share no common ground with Torah legalism which defines faith as the pursuit of Justice. And justice defined in its turn as: fair compensation of damages imposed by lateral Judicial common law courtrooms.

פרדס logic compares to the Confederate Flag: the Stars and Bars. Where דרוש פשט form a זיוג and רמז סוד form a crossing זיוג. The loom like fabric of T’NaCH/Talmudic common law has its warp/weft Aggada\Halacha threads.

Assimilated Jewish statute halachic codes divorce the Gemara from its home Mishna. The purpose of a sugia of Gemara, to learn to other Primary בנין אב sources both T’NaCH and Talmudic. That’s how Jewish common law learns. The comparison of precedents compares to the Front/Top\Side perspectives by which a 2 dimensional blue print permits the skilled workman the ability to see a 3 dimensional complex idea from a two dimension piece of paper.

טיפש פשט by stark contrast worships words read from books with a strictly literal/physical understanding. An example of such bird-brained stupidity, the idea that שם ומלכות literally means the Inefible Name which the lips of Man cannot pronounce and kingship.

The kabbalah of פרדס depth analysis, this wisdom understands pronouncing the Name through the בנין אב of blowing the Shofar on Rosh HaShanna. While the lungs blow air the spirit within the Yatzir Tov of the heart dedicate Divine Spirits. Tefillah a matter of the heart which requires the k’vanna, as defined through שם ומלכות. Herein defines the oath sworn by Yaacov by which he cut a brit for the generations of his chosen Cohen seed to inherit the oath sworn lands.

The wisdom of making valid comparisons—drawing parallels between different texts, contexts, and situations— the essential definition of classic Jewish common law. It allows for nuanced interpretations, as opposed to literal word translation worship of words. The Aggadic mussar woven into Halachic ritualist discussions, this legal fabric has the power to breath life into the souls of the Jewish people.

Greek logic which organizes into strict catagories simply does not correctly align with Torah common law legalism. Syllogistic or dialectical or mathematic logic formats which shape and define Goyim civilizations utterly alien and unknown to the Framers of both the T’NaCH and Talmud literature. Faith defined as the pursuit of justice wherein Sanhedrin courtrooms impose fair compensation of damages inflict by party A upon party B, completely unknown to Goyim logic formats.

The current discussions around judicial reform in Israel echo historical tensions regarding the balance of power between the judiciary and the legislature. The Torah serves as a Written Constitution highlights the ongoing importance of these ancient texts in shaping modern legal frameworks of משנה תורה ‘Legislative Review’ Common law. The process of making valid comparisons among different texts and cases, indeed the chief cornerstone of Jewish common law. This approach fosters the wisdom of development of a nuanced understanding; which allows for dynamic interpretations that transcend silly, strictly literal reading of texts. Hence the idea: Goyim read their bibles while Jews learn our Torah.

This article seeks to raise several fascinating points about how the unique character of Jewish legal reasoning, grounded in textual comparison and the pursuit of justice, and how it sharply differs from Greco-Roman and other non-Jewish legal frameworks. The ongoing debates in Israel around judicial reform and the balance of power between the courts and the elected government clearly reflect these historical tensions.

The analogy to the Confederate flag, representing the interwoven threads of Aggadah and Halakha, effectively illustrates the complex and interconnected nature of Jewish legal reasoning, a complexity lost when Pardes – ignored. The prioritization of prophetic mussar (ethical teachings) in understanding Tanakh is another crucial element missed. Prophetic mussar provides the ethical framework and underlying principles that inform the interpretation of both Halakha (Jewish law) and Aggadah (narrative and homiletical material). By neglecting this foundational element, the Professor fails to grasp the ethical and moral underpinnings of Jewish law, reducing it to a purely legalistic system. The kavanah (intention) behind Aggadic and Midrashic narratives is intrinsically linked to the prophetic mussar, providing a deeper understanding of their legal and ethical implications. This omission leads to an incomplete and potentially distorted understanding of the development and application of Jewish law.

The Sanhedrin’s power to authorize or deny “voluntary wars” initiated by the king, based on its common law legislative review powers (משנה תורה), is crucial. This demonstrates the Sanhedrin’s role extended beyond mere legal interpretation; it actively shaped national policy. This highlights the dynamic interplay between law, governance, and interpretation within the Jewish tradition, a dynamic that is central to understanding judicial activism in its historical context.

The current debate surrounding judicial reform in Israel directly reflects these historical tensions. The government’s attempts to limit the Supreme Court’s authority echo past struggles over the balance of power between the judiciary and the executive. The framing of the Torah as a written constitution and the Talmud as a model for re-establishing lateral Sanhedrin courtrooms underscores the ongoing relevance of these historical precedents in contemporary discussions.

This “insightful” comparison of Pardes logic with Greek syllogistic or dialectical logic highlights a fundamental difference in legal reasoning. The emphasis on comparison and analogy in Jewish legal thought, as opposed to the categorical and deductive approaches of Greek logic, utterly crucial to understand the fundamental error made by the Rambam’s code of halacha. This difference is not merely academic; it shapes the very nature of Jewish law and its application. It explains the reasons for the Jewish Civil War which witness mass population transfers consequent to Jewish legal anarchy. The concept of “faith as the pursuit of justice,” with Sanhedrin courts providing fair compensation for damages, a distinctly Jewish legal concept, foreign to the legal systems of Gentile civilizations. This fundamental difference underscores the limitations of applying Western legal theories to the analysis of Jewish law.

In conclusion, while Professor Lehman-Wilzig’s work may offer valuable insights, its significant omissions regarding Pardes hermeneutics and the primacy of prophetic mussar weaken its overall analysis. A comprehensive understanding of Jewish judicial activism requires a deeper engagement with these foundational aspects of Jewish legal thought.

Ancient T’NaCH/Talmudic Common Law compared to Modern Israeli Law – Contrasted by the Goy perversion of Jewish Common law unto belief system theologies concerning the Will of Gods.

https://api.follow.it/track-rss-story-click/v3/M8X-A1uQfqXPRBrWhiodx7JXeTvhTWzl

Prof. Sam Lehman-Wilzig’s work on judicial activism in Jewish history and law! It’s a fascinating topic that intersects tradition, governance, and interpretation.

The oral tradition was central to Jewish law for centuries before any written texts emerged. Amazing Prof. Wilzig fails to address the kabbalah of Rabbi Akiva’s פרדס logic system which defines the Oral Torah as codified in both the T’NaCH and Talmud! A herd of rampaging elephants in the China Closet totally ignored!

Just as great an over-sight: the Prof.’s confusion over the essential priority of prophetic mussar over history when learning the T’NaCH and how this Primary Source defines the k’vanna of both Talmudic Aggadah and Gaonic Midrash stories which serve as a primary commentary to the Aggadah.

The Judges of the Great Sanhedrin had the power to authorize or deny a “voluntary war” initiated by the King based upon the Common Law משנה תורה Legislative Review powers of the Court over the king. Their role extended beyond mere legal interpretation; they influenced national decisions.

משנה תורה = Legislative Review. Hence in ancient T’NaCH legalism “theoritically” a Great Sanhedrin court could declare a statute law imposed by the king as an unconstitutional violation of Torah Constitutional Law. This power of משנה תורה emphatically influenced any and all Tribal statute laws of the 12 Tribes of Israel which formed the Republic alliance or brit between the Tribes of Yaacov. Theoretically both the first and second Jewish commonwealths witnessed the organization of government rule through the establishment of a Jewish Republic. Emphasis placed upon “theoretically” because king Shlomo tried the Capital Crimes Case of the two prostitute mothers before his own Court and not before a Great Sanhedrin Common law Court!

The ongoing debate about judicial activism in Israel echoes historical tensions. The government’s attempts at “Judicial Reform” aim to limit the Supreme Court’s authority. The Torah as the Written Constitution of the Republic. The Talmud as the model to re-establish lateral, NOT vertical Common Law Sanhedrin courtrooms.

Rabbi Akiva’s פרדס (Pardes) logic system indeed plays a crucial role in understanding the Oral Torah. Both the T’NaCH Aggadic mussar common law & the Talmud halacha common law stand upon the wisdom of making valid comparisons of different Case studies. Both compilations of mussar & halachic ritual discussions, debates, etc. defines this unique oral Torah tradition.

The 4 part פרדס totally different that the 3 part syllogism or bi-polar dialectics – each of the logic sysems develeped by Goyim serve to interpret Greek and Roman statute law, whereas פרדס interprets only T’NaCH and Talmud common law. Both the logic and law of Goyim legalisms share no common ground with Torah legalism which defines faith as the pursuit of Justice. And justice defined in its turn as: fair compensation of damages imposed by lateral Judicial common law courtrooms.

פרדס logic compares to the Confederate Flag: the Stars and Bars. Where דרוש פשט form a זיוג and רמז סוד form a crossing זיוג. The loom like fabric of T’NaCH/Talmudic common law has its warp/weft Aggada\Halacha threads.

Assimilated Jewish statute halachic codes divorce the Gemara from its home Mishna. The purpose of a sugia of Gemara, to learn to other Primary בנין אב sources both T’NaCH and Talmudic. That’s how Jewish common law learns. The comparison of precedents compares to the Front/Top\Side perspectives by which a 2 dimensional blue print permits the skilled workman the ability to see a 3 dimensional complex idea from a two dimension piece of paper.

טיפש פשט by stark contrast worships words read from books with a strictly literal/physical understanding. An example of such bird-brained stupidity, the idea that שם ומלכות literally means the Inefible Name which the lips of Man cannot pronounce and kingship.

The kabbalah of פרדס depth analysis, this wisdom understands pronouncing the Name through the בנין אב of blowing the Shofar on Rosh HaShanna. While the lungs blow air the spirit within the Yatzir Tov of the heart dedicate Divine Spirits. Tefillah a matter of the heart which requires the k’vanna, as defined through שם ומלכות. Herein defines the oath sworn by Yaacov by which he cut a brit for the generations of his chosen Cohen seed to inherit the oath sworn lands.

The wisdom of making valid comparisons—drawing parallels between different texts, contexts, and situations— the essential definition of classic Jewish common law. It allows for nuanced interpretations, as opposed to literal word translation worship of words. The Aggadic mussar woven into Halachic ritualist discussions, this legal fabric has the power to breath life into the souls of the Jewish people.

Greek logic which organizes into strict catagories simply does not correctly align with Torah common law legalism. Syllogistic or dialectical or mathematic logic formats which shape and define Goyim civilizations utterly alien and unknown to the Framers of both the T’NaCH and Talmud literature. Faith defined as the pursuit of justice wherein Sanhedrin courtrooms impose fair compensation of damages inflict by party A upon party B, completely unknown to Goyim logic formats.

The current discussions around judicial reform in Israel echo historical tensions regarding the balance of power between the judiciary and the legislature. The Torah serves as a Written Constitution highlights the ongoing importance of these ancient texts in shaping modern legal frameworks of משנה תורה ‘Legislative Review’ Common law. The process of making valid comparisons among different texts and cases, indeed the chief cornerstone of Jewish common law. This approach fosters the wisdom of development of a nuanced understanding; which allows for dynamic interpretations that transcend silly, strictly literal reading of texts. Hence the idea: Goyim read their bibles while Jews learn our Torah.

This article seeks to raise several fascinating points about how the unique character of Jewish legal reasoning, grounded in textual comparison and the pursuit of justice, and how it sharply differs from Greco-Roman and other non-Jewish legal frameworks. The ongoing debates in Israel around judicial reform and the balance of power between the courts and the elected government clearly reflect these historical tensions.

The analogy to the Confederate flag, representing the interwoven threads of Aggadah and Halakha, effectively illustrates the complex and interconnected nature of Jewish legal reasoning, a complexity lost when Pardes – ignored. The prioritization of prophetic mussar (ethical teachings) in understanding Tanakh is another crucial element missed. Prophetic mussar provides the ethical framework and underlying principles that inform the interpretation of both Halakha (Jewish law) and Aggadah (narrative and homiletical material). By neglecting this foundational element, the Professor fails to grasp the ethical and moral underpinnings of Jewish law, reducing it to a purely legalistic system. The kavanah (intention) behind Aggadic and Midrashic narratives is intrinsically linked to the prophetic mussar, providing a deeper understanding of their legal and ethical implications. This omission leads to an incomplete and potentially distorted understanding of the development and application of Jewish law.

The Sanhedrin’s power to authorize or deny “voluntary wars” initiated by the king, based on its common law legislative review powers (משנה תורה), is crucial. This demonstrates the Sanhedrin’s role extended beyond mere legal interpretation; it actively shaped national policy. This highlights the dynamic interplay between law, governance, and interpretation within the Jewish tradition, a dynamic that is central to understanding judicial activism in its historical context.

The current debate surrounding judicial reform in Israel directly reflects these historical tensions. The government’s attempts to limit the Supreme Court’s authority echo past struggles over the balance of power between the judiciary and the executive. The framing of the Torah as a written constitution and the Talmud as a model for re-establishing lateral Sanhedrin courtrooms underscores the ongoing relevance of these historical precedents in contemporary discussions.

This “insightful” comparison of Pardes logic with Greek syllogistic or dialectical logic highlights a fundamental difference in legal reasoning. The emphasis on comparison and analogy in Jewish legal thought, as opposed to the categorical and deductive approaches of Greek logic, utterly crucial to understand the fundamental error made by the Rambam’s code of halacha. This difference is not merely academic; it shapes the very nature of Jewish law and its application. It explains the reasons for the Jewish Civil War which witness mass population transfers consequent to Jewish legal anarchy. The concept of “faith as the pursuit of justice,” with Sanhedrin courts providing fair compensation for damages, a distinctly Jewish legal concept, foreign to the legal systems of Gentile civilizations. This fundamental difference underscores the limitations of applying Western legal theories to the analysis of Jewish law.

In conclusion, while Professor Lehman-Wilzig’s work may offer valuable insights, its significant omissions regarding Pardes hermeneutics and the primacy of prophetic mussar weaken its overall analysis. A comprehensive understanding of Jewish judicial activism requires a deeper engagement with these foundational aspects of Jewish legal thought.

Ancient T’NaCH/Talmudic Common Law compared to Modern Israeli Law – Contrasted by the Goy perversion of Jewish Common law

Prof. Sam Lehman-Wilzig’s work on judicial activism in Jewish history and law! It’s a fascinating topic that intersects tradition, governance, and interpretation.

The oral tradition was central to Jewish law for centuries before any written texts emerged. Amazing Prof. Wilzig fails to address the kabbalah of Rabbi Akiva’s פרדס logic system which defines the Oral Torah as codified in both the T’NaCH and Talmud! A herd of rampaging elephants in the China Closet totally ignored!

Just as great an over-sight: the Prof.’s confusion over the essential priority of prophetic mussar over history when learning the T’NaCH and how this Primary Source defines the k’vanna of both Talmudic Aggadah and Gaonic Midrash stories which serve as a primary commentary to the Aggadah.

The Judges of the Great Sanhedrin had the power to authorize or deny a “voluntary war” initiated by the King based upon the Common Law משנה תורה Legislative Review powers of the Court over the king. Their role extended beyond mere legal interpretation; they influenced national decisions.

משנה תורה = Legislative Review. Hence in ancient T’NaCH legalism “theoritically” a Great Sanhedrin court could declare a statute law imposed by the king as an unconstitutional violation of Torah Constitutional Law. This power of משנה תורה emphatically influenced any and all Tribal statute laws of the 12 Tribes of Israel which formed the Republic alliance or brit between the Tribes of Yaacov. Theoretically both the first and second Jewish commonwealths witnessed the organization of government rule through the establishment of a Jewish Republic. Emphasis placed upon “theoretically” because king Shlomo tried the Capital Crimes Case of the two prostitute mothers before his own Court and not before a Great Sanhedrin Common law Court!

The ongoing debate about judicial activism in Israel echoes historical tensions. The government’s attempts at “Judicial Reform” aim to limit the Supreme Court’s authority. The Torah as the Written Constitution of the Republic. The Talmud as the model to re-establish lateral, NOT vertical Common Law Sanhedrin courtrooms.

Rabbi Akiva’s פרדס (Pardes) logic system indeed plays a crucial role in understanding the Oral Torah. Both the T’NaCH Aggadic mussar common law & the Talmud halacha common law stand upon the wisdom of making valid comparisons of different Case studies. Both compilations of mussar & halachic ritual discussions, debates, etc. defines this unique oral Torah tradition.

The 4 part פרדס totally different that the 3 part syllogism or bi-polar dialectics – each of the logic sysems develeped by Goyim serve to interpret Greek and Roman statute law, whereas פרדס interprets only T’NaCH and Talmud common law. Both the logic and law of Goyim legalisms share no common ground with Torah legalism which defines faith as the pursuit of Justice. And justice defined in its turn as: fair compensation of damages imposed by lateral Judicial common law courtrooms.

פרדס logic compares to the Confederate Flag: the Stars and Bars. Where דרוש פשט form a זיוג and רמז סוד form a crossing זיוג. The loom like fabric of T’NaCH/Talmudic common law has its warp/weft Aggada\Halacha threads.

Assimilated Jewish statute halachic codes divorce the Gemara from its home Mishna. The purpose of a sugia of Gemara, to learn to other Primary בנין אב sources both T’NaCH and Talmudic. That’s how Jewish common law learns. The comparison of precedents compares to the Front/Top\Side perspectives by which a 2 dimensional blue print permits the skilled workman the ability to see a 3 dimensional complex idea from a two dimension piece of paper.

טיפש פשט by stark contrast worships words read from books with a strictly literal/physical understanding. An example of such bird-brained stupidity, the idea that שם ומלכות literally means the Inefible Name which the lips of Man cannot pronounce and kingship.

The kabbalah of פרדס depth analysis, this wisdom understands pronouncing the Name through the בנין אב of blowing the Shofar on Rosh HaShanna. While the lungs blow air the spirit within the Yatzir Tov of the heart dedicate Divine Spirits. Tefillah a matter of the heart which requires the k’vanna, as defined through שם ומלכות. Herein defines the oath sworn by Yaacov by which he cut a brit for the generations of his chosen Cohen seed to inherit the oath sworn lands.

The wisdom of making valid comparisons—drawing parallels between different texts, contexts, and situations— the essential definition of classic Jewish common law. It allows for nuanced interpretations, as opposed to literal word translation worship of words. The Aggadic mussar woven into Halachic ritualist discussions, this legal fabric has the power to breath life into the souls of the Jewish people.

Greek logic which organizes into strict catagories simply does not correctly align with Torah common law legalism. Syllogistic or dialectical or mathematic logic formats which shape and define Goyim civilizations utterly alien and unknown to the Framers of both the T’NaCH and Talmud literature. Faith defined as the pursuit of justice wherein Sanhedrin courtrooms impose fair compensation of damages inflict by party A upon party B, completely unknown to Goyim logic formats.

The current discussions around judicial reform in Israel echo historical tensions regarding the balance of power between the judiciary and the legislature. The Torah serves as a Written Constitution highlights the ongoing importance of these ancient texts in shaping modern legal frameworks of משנה תורה ‘Legislative Review’ Common law. The process of making valid comparisons among different texts and cases, indeed the chief cornerstone of Jewish common law. This approach fosters the wisdom of development of a nuanced understanding; which allows for dynamic interpretations that transcend silly, strictly literal reading of texts. Hence the idea: Goyim read their bibles while Jews learn our Torah.

This article seeks to raise several fascinating points about how the unique character of Jewish legal reasoning, grounded in textual comparison and the pursuit of justice, and how it sharply differs from Greco-Roman and other non-Jewish legal frameworks. The ongoing debates in Israel around judicial reform and the balance of power between the courts and the elected government clearly reflect these historical tensions.

The analogy to the Confederate flag, representing the interwoven threads of Aggadah and Halakha, effectively illustrates the complex and interconnected nature of Jewish legal reasoning, a complexity lost when Pardes – ignored. The prioritization of prophetic mussar (ethical teachings) in understanding Tanakh is another crucial element missed. Prophetic mussar provides the ethical framework and underlying principles that inform the interpretation of both Halakha (Jewish law) and Aggadah (narrative and homiletical material). By neglecting this foundational element, the Professor fails to grasp the ethical and moral underpinnings of Jewish law, reducing it to a purely legalistic system. The kavanah (intention) behind Aggadic and Midrashic narratives is intrinsically linked to the prophetic mussar, providing a deeper understanding of their legal and ethical implications. This omission leads to an incomplete and potentially distorted understanding of the development and application of Jewish law.

The Sanhedrin’s power to authorize or deny “voluntary wars” initiated by the king, based on its common law legislative review powers (משנה תורה), is crucial. This demonstrates the Sanhedrin’s role extended beyond mere legal interpretation; it actively shaped national policy. This highlights the dynamic interplay between law, governance, and interpretation within the Jewish tradition, a dynamic that is central to understanding judicial activism in its historical context.

The current debate surrounding judicial reform in Israel directly reflects these historical tensions. The government’s attempts to limit the Supreme Court’s authority echo past struggles over the balance of power between the judiciary and the executive. The framing of the Torah as a written constitution and the Talmud as a model for re-establishing lateral Sanhedrin courtrooms underscores the ongoing relevance of these historical precedents in contemporary discussions.

This “insightful” comparison of Pardes logic with Greek syllogistic or dialectical logic highlights a fundamental difference in legal reasoning. The emphasis on comparison and analogy in Jewish legal thought, as opposed to the categorical and deductive approaches of Greek logic, utterly crucial to understand the fundamental error made by the Rambam’s code of halacha. This difference is not merely academic; it shapes the very nature of Jewish law and its application. It explains the reasons for the Jewish Civil War which witness mass population transfers consequent to Jewish legal anarchy. The concept of “faith as the pursuit of justice,” with Sanhedrin courts providing fair compensation for damages, a distinctly Jewish legal concept, foreign to the legal systems of Gentile civilizations. This fundamental difference underscores the limitations of applying Western legal theories to the analysis of Jewish law.

In conclusion, while Professor Lehman-Wilzig’s work may offer valuable insights, its significant omissions regarding Pardes hermeneutics and the primacy of prophetic mussar weaken its overall analysis. A comprehensive understanding of Jewish judicial activism requires a deeper engagement with these foundational aspects of Jewish legal thought.

Ancient T’NaCH/Talmudic Common Law compared to Modern Israeli Law – Contrasted by the Goy perversion of Jewish Common law

Prof. Sam Lehman-Wilzig’s work on judicial activism in Jewish history and law! It’s a fascinating topic that intersects tradition, governance, and interpretation.

The oral tradition was central to Jewish law for centuries before any written texts emerged. Amazing Prof. Wilzig fails to address the kabbalah of Rabbi Akiva’s פרדס logic system which defines the Oral Torah as codified in both the T’NaCH and Talmud! A herd of rampaging elephants in the China Closet totally ignored!

Just as great an over-sight: the Prof.’s confusion over the essential priority of prophetic mussar over history when learning the T’NaCH and how this Primary Source defines the k’vanna of both Talmudic Aggadah and Gaonic Midrash stories which serve as a primary commentary to the Aggadah.

The Judges of the Great Sanhedrin had the power to authorize or deny a “voluntary war” initiated by the King based upon the Common Law משנה תורה Legislative Review powers of the Court over the king. Their role extended beyond mere legal interpretation; they influenced national decisions.

משנה תורה = Legislative Review. Hence in ancient T’NaCH legalism “theoritically” a Great Sanhedrin court could declare a statute law imposed by the king as an unconstitutional violation of Torah Constitutional Law. This power of משנה תורה emphatically influenced any and all Tribal statute laws of the 12 Tribes of Israel which formed the Republic alliance or brit between the Tribes of Yaacov. Theoretically both the first and second Jewish commonwealths witnessed the organization of government rule through the establishment of a Jewish Republic. Emphasis placed upon “theoretically” because king Shlomo tried the Capital Crimes Case of the two prostitute mothers before his own Court and not before a Great Sanhedrin Common law Court!

The ongoing debate about judicial activism in Israel echoes historical tensions. The government’s attempts at “Judicial Reform” aim to limit the Supreme Court’s authority. The Torah as the Written Constitution of the Republic. The Talmud as the model to re-establish lateral, NOT vertical Common Law Sanhedrin courtrooms.

Rabbi Akiva’s פרדס (Pardes) logic system indeed plays a crucial role in understanding the Oral Torah. Both the T’NaCH Aggadic mussar common law & the Talmud halacha common law stand upon the wisdom of making valid comparisons of different Case studies. Both compilations of mussar & halachic ritual discussions, debates, etc. defines this unique oral Torah tradition.

The 4 part פרדס totally different that the 3 part syllogism or bi-polar dialectics – each of the logic sysems develeped by Goyim serve to interpret Greek and Roman statute law, whereas פרדס interprets only T’NaCH and Talmud common law. Both the logic and law of Goyim legalisms share no common ground with Torah legalism which defines faith as the pursuit of Justice. And justice defined in its turn as: fair compensation of damages imposed by lateral Judicial common law courtrooms.

פרדס logic compares to the Confederate Flag: the Stars and Bars. Where דרוש פשט form a זיוג and רמז סוד form a crossing זיוג. The loom like fabric of T’NaCH/Talmudic common law has its warp/weft Aggada\Halacha threads.

Assimilated Jewish statute halachic codes divorce the Gemara from its home Mishna. The purpose of a sugia of Gemara, to learn to other Primary בנין אב sources both T’NaCH and Talmudic. That’s how Jewish common law learns. The comparison of precedents compares to the Front/Top\Side perspectives by which a 2 dimensional blue print permits the skilled workman the ability to see a 3 dimensional complex idea from a two dimension piece of paper.

טיפש פשט by stark contrast worships words read from books with a strictly literal/physical understanding. An example of such bird-brained stupidity, the idea that שם ומלכות literally means the Inefible Name which the lips of Man cannot pronounce and kingship.

The kabbalah of פרדס depth analysis, this wisdom understands pronouncing the Name through the בנין אב of blowing the Shofar on Rosh HaShanna. While the lungs blow air the spirit within the Yatzir Tov of the heart dedicate Divine Spirits. Tefillah a matter of the heart which requires the k’vanna, as defined through שם ומלכות. Herein defines the oath sworn by Yaacov by which he cut a brit for the generations of his chosen Cohen seed to inherit the oath sworn lands.

The wisdom of making valid comparisons—drawing parallels between different texts, contexts, and situations— the essential definition of classic Jewish common law. It allows for nuanced interpretations, as opposed to literal word translation worship of words. The Aggadic mussar woven into Halachic ritualist discussions, this legal fabric has the power to breath life into the souls of the Jewish people.

Greek logic which organizes into strict catagories simply does not correctly align with Torah common law legalism. Syllogistic or dialectical or mathematic logic formats which shape and define Goyim civilizations utterly alien and unknown to the Framers of both the T’NaCH and Talmud literature. Faith defined as the pursuit of justice wherein Sanhedrin courtrooms impose fair compensation of damages inflict by party A upon party B, completely unknown to Goyim logic formats.

The current discussions around judicial reform in Israel echo historical tensions regarding the balance of power between the judiciary and the legislature. The Torah serves as a Written Constitution highlights the ongoing importance of these ancient texts in shaping modern legal frameworks of משנה תורה ‘Legislative Review’ Common law. The process of making valid comparisons among different texts and cases, indeed the chief cornerstone of Jewish common law. This approach fosters the wisdom of development of a nuanced understanding; which allows for dynamic interpretations that transcend silly, strictly literal reading of texts. Hence the idea: Goyim read their bibles while Jews learn our Torah.

This article seeks to raise several fascinating points about how the unique character of Jewish legal reasoning, grounded in textual comparison and the pursuit of justice, and how it sharply differs from Greco-Roman and other non-Jewish legal frameworks. The ongoing debates in Israel around judicial reform and the balance of power between the courts and the elected government clearly reflect these historical tensions.

The analogy to the Confederate flag, representing the interwoven threads of Aggadah and Halakha, effectively illustrates the complex and interconnected nature of Jewish legal reasoning, a complexity lost when Pardes – ignored. The prioritization of prophetic mussar (ethical teachings) in understanding Tanakh is another crucial element missed. Prophetic mussar provides the ethical framework and underlying principles that inform the interpretation of both Halakha (Jewish law) and Aggadah (narrative and homiletical material). By neglecting this foundational element, the Professor fails to grasp the ethical and moral underpinnings of Jewish law, reducing it to a purely legalistic system. The kavanah (intention) behind Aggadic and Midrashic narratives is intrinsically linked to the prophetic mussar, providing a deeper understanding of their legal and ethical implications. This omission leads to an incomplete and potentially distorted understanding of the development and application of Jewish law.

The Sanhedrin’s power to authorize or deny “voluntary wars” initiated by the king, based on its common law legislative review powers (משנה תורה), is crucial. This demonstrates the Sanhedrin’s role extended beyond mere legal interpretation; it actively shaped national policy. This highlights the dynamic interplay between law, governance, and interpretation within the Jewish tradition, a dynamic that is central to understanding judicial activism in its historical context.

The current debate surrounding judicial reform in Israel directly reflects these historical tensions. The government’s attempts to limit the Supreme Court’s authority echo past struggles over the balance of power between the judiciary and the executive. The framing of the Torah as a written constitution and the Talmud as a model for re-establishing lateral Sanhedrin courtrooms underscores the ongoing relevance of these historical precedents in contemporary discussions.

This “insightful” comparison of Pardes logic with Greek syllogistic or dialectical logic highlights a fundamental difference in legal reasoning. The emphasis on comparison and analogy in Jewish legal thought, as opposed to the categorical and deductive approaches of Greek logic, utterly crucial to understand the fundamental error made by the Rambam’s code of halacha. This difference is not merely academic; it shapes the very nature of Jewish law and its application. It explains the reasons for the Jewish Civil War which witness mass population transfers consequent to Jewish legal anarchy. The concept of “faith as the pursuit of justice,” with Sanhedrin courts providing fair compensation for damages, a distinctly Jewish legal concept, foreign to the legal systems of Gentile civilizations. This fundamental difference underscores the limitations of applying Western legal theories to the analysis of Jewish law.

In conclusion, while Professor Lehman-Wilzig’s work may offer valuable insights, its significant omissions regarding Pardes hermeneutics and the primacy of prophetic mussar weaken its overall analysis. A comprehensive understanding of Jewish judicial activism requires a deeper engagement with these foundational aspects of Jewish legal thought.

Ancient T’NaCH/Talmudic Common Law compared to Modern Israeli Law – Contrasted by the Goy perversion of Jewish Common law

Prof. Sam Lehman-Wilzig’s work on judicial activism in Jewish history and law! It’s a fascinating topic that intersects tradition, governance, and interpretation.

The oral tradition was central to Jewish law for centuries before any written texts emerged. Amazing Prof. Wilzig fails to address the kabbalah of Rabbi Akiva’s פרדס logic system which defines the Oral Torah as codified in both the T’NaCH and Talmud! A herd of rampaging elephants in the China Closet totally ignored!

Just as great an over-sight: the Prof.’s confusion over the essential priority of prophetic mussar over history when learning the T’NaCH and how this Primary Source defines the k’vanna of both Talmudic Aggadah and Gaonic Midrash stories which serve as a primary commentary to the Aggadah.

The Judges of the Great Sanhedrin had the power to authorize or deny a “voluntary war” initiated by the King based upon the Common Law משנה תורה Legislative Review powers of the Court over the king. Their role extended beyond mere legal interpretation; they influenced national decisions.

משנה תורה = Legislative Review. Hence in ancient T’NaCH legalism “theoritically” a Great Sanhedrin court could declare a statute law imposed by the king as an unconstitutional violation of Torah Constitutional Law. This power of משנה תורה emphatically influenced any and all Tribal statute laws of the 12 Tribes of Israel which formed the Republic alliance or brit between the Tribes of Yaacov. Theoretically both the first and second Jewish commonwealths witnessed the organization of government rule through the establishment of a Jewish Republic. Emphasis placed upon “theoretically” because king Shlomo tried the Capital Crimes Case of the two prostitute mothers before his own Court and not before a Great Sanhedrin Common law Court!

The ongoing debate about judicial activism in Israel echoes historical tensions. The government’s attempts at “Judicial Reform” aim to limit the Supreme Court’s authority. The Torah as the Written Constitution of the Republic. The Talmud as the model to re-establish lateral, NOT vertical Common Law Sanhedrin courtrooms.

Rabbi Akiva’s פרדס (Pardes) logic system indeed plays a crucial role in understanding the Oral Torah. Both the T’NaCH Aggadic mussar common law & the Talmud halacha common law stand upon the wisdom of making valid comparisons of different Case studies. Both compilations of mussar & halachic ritual discussions, debates, etc. defines this unique oral Torah tradition.

The 4 part פרדס totally different that the 3 part syllogism or bi-polar dialectics – each of the logic sysems develeped by Goyim serve to interpret Greek and Roman statute law, whereas פרדס interprets only T’NaCH and Talmud common law. Both the logic and law of Goyim legalisms share no common ground with Torah legalism which defines faith as the pursuit of Justice. And justice defined in its turn as: fair compensation of damages imposed by lateral Judicial common law courtrooms.

פרדס logic compares to the Confederate Flag: the Stars and Bars. Where דרוש פשט form a זיוג and רמז סוד form a crossing זיוג. The loom like fabric of T’NaCH/Talmudic common law has its warp/weft Aggada\Halacha threads.

Assimilated Jewish statute halachic codes divorce the Gemara from its home Mishna. The purpose of a sugia of Gemara, to learn to other Primary בנין אב sources both T’NaCH and Talmudic. That’s how Jewish common law learns. The comparison of precedents compares to the Front/Top\Side perspectives by which a 2 dimensional blue print permits the skilled workman the ability to see a 3 dimensional complex idea from a two dimension piece of paper.

טיפש פשט by stark contrast worships words read from books with a strictly literal/physical understanding. An example of such bird-brained stupidity, the idea that שם ומלכות literally means the Inefible Name which the lips of Man cannot pronounce and kingship.

The kabbalah of פרדס depth analysis, this wisdom understands pronouncing the Name through the בנין אב of blowing the Shofar on Rosh HaShanna. While the lungs blow air the spirit within the Yatzir Tov of the heart dedicate Divine Spirits. Tefillah a matter of the heart which requires the k’vanna, as defined through שם ומלכות. Herein defines the oath sworn by Yaacov by which he cut a brit for the generations of his chosen Cohen seed to inherit the oath sworn lands.

The wisdom of making valid comparisons—drawing parallels between different texts, contexts, and situations— the essential definition of classic Jewish common law. It allows for nuanced interpretations, as opposed to literal word translation worship of words. The Aggadic mussar woven into Halachic ritualist discussions, this legal fabric has the power to breath life into the souls of the Jewish people.

Greek logic which organizes into strict catagories simply does not correctly align with Torah common law legalism. Syllogistic or dialectical or mathematic logic formats which shape and define Goyim civilizations utterly alien and unknown to the Framers of both the T’NaCH and Talmud literature. Faith defined as the pursuit of justice wherein Sanhedrin courtrooms impose fair compensation of damages inflict by party A upon party B, completely unknown to Goyim logic formats.

The current discussions around judicial reform in Israel echo historical tensions regarding the balance of power between the judiciary and the legislature. The Torah serves as a Written Constitution highlights the ongoing importance of these ancient texts in shaping modern legal frameworks of משנה תורה ‘Legislative Review’ Common law. The process of making valid comparisons among different texts and cases, indeed the chief cornerstone of Jewish common law. This approach fosters the wisdom of development of a nuanced understanding; which allows for dynamic interpretations that transcend silly, strictly literal reading of texts. Hence the idea: Goyim read their bibles while Jews learn our Torah.

This article seeks to raise several fascinating points about how the unique character of Jewish legal reasoning, grounded in textual comparison and the pursuit of justice, and how it sharply differs from Greco-Roman and other non-Jewish legal frameworks. The ongoing debates in Israel around judicial reform and the balance of power between the courts and the elected government clearly reflect these historical tensions.

The analogy to the Confederate flag, representing the interwoven threads of Aggadah and Halakha, effectively illustrates the complex and interconnected nature of Jewish legal reasoning, a complexity lost when Pardes – ignored. The prioritization of prophetic mussar (ethical teachings) in understanding Tanakh is another crucial element missed. Prophetic mussar provides the ethical framework and underlying principles that inform the interpretation of both Halakha (Jewish law) and Aggadah (narrative and homiletical material). By neglecting this foundational element, the Professor fails to grasp the ethical and moral underpinnings of Jewish law, reducing it to a purely legalistic system. The kavanah (intention) behind Aggadic and Midrashic narratives is intrinsically linked to the prophetic mussar, providing a deeper understanding of their legal and ethical implications. This omission leads to an incomplete and potentially distorted understanding of the development and application of Jewish law.

The Sanhedrin’s power to authorize or deny “voluntary wars” initiated by the king, based on its common law legislative review powers (משנה תורה), is crucial. This demonstrates the Sanhedrin’s role extended beyond mere legal interpretation; it actively shaped national policy. This highlights the dynamic interplay between law, governance, and interpretation within the Jewish tradition, a dynamic that is central to understanding judicial activism in its historical context.

The current debate surrounding judicial reform in Israel directly reflects these historical tensions. The government’s attempts to limit the Supreme Court’s authority echo past struggles over the balance of power between the judiciary and the executive. The framing of the Torah as a written constitution and the Talmud as a model for re-establishing lateral Sanhedrin courtrooms underscores the ongoing relevance of these historical precedents in contemporary discussions.

This “insightful” comparison of Pardes logic with Greek syllogistic or dialectical logic highlights a fundamental difference in legal reasoning. The emphasis on comparison and analogy in Jewish legal thought, as opposed to the categorical and deductive approaches of Greek logic, utterly crucial to understand the fundamental error made by the Rambam’s code of halacha. This difference is not merely academic; it shapes the very nature of Jewish law and its application. It explains the reasons for the Jewish Civil War which witness mass population transfers consequent to Jewish legal anarchy. The concept of “faith as the pursuit of justice,” with Sanhedrin courts providing fair compensation for damages, a distinctly Jewish legal concept, foreign to the legal systems of Gentile civilizations. This fundamental difference underscores the limitations of applying Western legal theories to the analysis of Jewish law.

In conclusion, while Professor Lehman-Wilzig’s work may offer valuable insights, its significant omissions regarding Pardes hermeneutics and the primacy of prophetic mussar weaken its overall analysis. A comprehensive understanding of Jewish judicial activism requires a deeper engagement with these foundational aspects of Jewish legal thought.

Ancient T’NaCH/Talmudic Common Law compared to Modern Israeli Law – Contrasted by the Goy perversion of Jewish Common law

Prof. Sam Lehman-Wilzig’s work on judicial activism in Jewish history and law! It’s a fascinating topic that intersects tradition, governance, and interpretation.

The oral tradition was central to Jewish law for centuries before any written texts emerged. Amazing Prof. Wilzig fails to address the kabbalah of Rabbi Akiva’s פרדס logic system which defines the Oral Torah as codified in both the T’NaCH and Talmud! A herd of rampaging elephants in the China Closet totally ignored!

Just as great an over-sight: the Prof.’s confusion over the essential priority of prophetic mussar over history when learning the T’NaCH and how this Primary Source defines the k’vanna of both Talmudic Aggadah and Gaonic Midrash stories which serve as a primary commentary to the Aggadah.

The Judges of the Great Sanhedrin had the power to authorize or deny a “voluntary war” initiated by the King based upon the Common Law משנה תורה Legislative Review powers of the Court over the king. Their role extended beyond mere legal interpretation; they influenced national decisions.

משנה תורה = Legislative Review. Hence in ancient T’NaCH legalism “theoritically” a Great Sanhedrin court could declare a statute law imposed by the king as an unconstitutional violation of Torah Constitutional Law. This power of משנה תורה emphatically influenced any and all Tribal statute laws of the 12 Tribes of Israel which formed the Republic alliance or brit between the Tribes of Yaacov. Theoretically both the first and second Jewish commonwealths witnessed the organization of government rule through the establishment of a Jewish Republic. Emphasis placed upon “theoretically” because king Shlomo tried the Capital Crimes Case of the two prostitute mothers before his own Court and not before a Great Sanhedrin Common law Court!

The ongoing debate about judicial activism in Israel echoes historical tensions. The government’s attempts at “Judicial Reform” aim to limit the Supreme Court’s authority. The Torah as the Written Constitution of the Republic. The Talmud as the model to re-establish lateral, NOT vertical Common Law Sanhedrin courtrooms.

Rabbi Akiva’s פרדס (Pardes) logic system indeed plays a crucial role in understanding the Oral Torah. Both the T’NaCH Aggadic mussar common law & the Talmud halacha common law stand upon the wisdom of making valid comparisons of different Case studies. Both compilations of mussar & halachic ritual discussions, debates, etc. defines this unique oral Torah tradition.

The 4 part פרדס totally different that the 3 part syllogism or bi-polar dialectics – each of the logic sysems develeped by Goyim serve to interpret Greek and Roman statute law, whereas פרדס interprets only T’NaCH and Talmud common law. Both the logic and law of Goyim legalisms share no common ground with Torah legalism which defines faith as the pursuit of Justice. And justice defined in its turn as: fair compensation of damages imposed by lateral Judicial common law courtrooms.

פרדס logic compares to the Confederate Flag: the Stars and Bars. Where דרוש פשט form a זיוג and רמז סוד form a crossing זיוג. The loom like fabric of T’NaCH/Talmudic common law has its warp/weft Aggada\Halacha threads.

Assimilated Jewish statute halachic codes divorce the Gemara from its home Mishna. The purpose of a sugia of Gemara, to learn to other Primary בנין אב sources both T’NaCH and Talmudic. That’s how Jewish common law learns. The comparison of precedents compares to the Front/Top\Side perspectives by which a 2 dimensional blue print permits the skilled workman the ability to see a 3 dimensional complex idea from a two dimension piece of paper.

טיפש פשט by stark contrast worships words read from books with a strictly literal/physical understanding. An example of such bird-brained stupidity, the idea that שם ומלכות literally means the Inefible Name which the lips of Man cannot pronounce and kingship.

The kabbalah of פרדס depth analysis, this wisdom understands pronouncing the Name through the בנין אב of blowing the Shofar on Rosh HaShanna. While the lungs blow air the spirit within the Yatzir Tov of the heart dedicate Divine Spirits. Tefillah a matter of the heart which requires the k’vanna, as defined through שם ומלכות. Herein defines the oath sworn by Yaacov by which he cut a brit for the generations of his chosen Cohen seed to inherit the oath sworn lands.

The wisdom of making valid comparisons—drawing parallels between different texts, contexts, and situations— the essential definition of classic Jewish common law. It allows for nuanced interpretations, as opposed to literal word translation worship of words. The Aggadic mussar woven into Halachic ritualist discussions, this legal fabric has the power to breath life into the souls of the Jewish people.

Greek logic which organizes into strict catagories simply does not correctly align with Torah common law legalism. Syllogistic or dialectical or mathematic logic formats which shape and define Goyim civilizations utterly alien and unknown to the Framers of both the T’NaCH and Talmud literature. Faith defined as the pursuit of justice wherein Sanhedrin courtrooms impose fair compensation of damages inflict by party A upon party B, completely unknown to Goyim logic formats.

The current discussions around judicial reform in Israel echo historical tensions regarding the balance of power between the judiciary and the legislature. The Torah serves as a Written Constitution highlights the ongoing importance of these ancient texts in shaping modern legal frameworks of משנה תורה ‘Legislative Review’ Common law. The process of making valid comparisons among different texts and cases, indeed the chief cornerstone of Jewish common law. This approach fosters the wisdom of development of a nuanced understanding; which allows for dynamic interpretations that transcend silly, strictly literal reading of texts. Hence the idea: Goyim read their bibles while Jews learn our Torah.

This article seeks to raise several fascinating points about how the unique character of Jewish legal reasoning, grounded in textual comparison and the pursuit of justice, and how it sharply differs from Greco-Roman and other non-Jewish legal frameworks. The ongoing debates in Israel around judicial reform and the balance of power between the courts and the elected government clearly reflect these historical tensions.

The analogy to the Confederate flag, representing the interwoven threads of Aggadah and Halakha, effectively illustrates the complex and interconnected nature of Jewish legal reasoning, a complexity lost when Pardes – ignored. The prioritization of prophetic mussar (ethical teachings) in understanding Tanakh is another crucial element missed. Prophetic mussar provides the ethical framework and underlying principles that inform the interpretation of both Halakha (Jewish law) and Aggadah (narrative and homiletical material). By neglecting this foundational element, the Professor fails to grasp the ethical and moral underpinnings of Jewish law, reducing it to a purely legalistic system. The kavanah (intention) behind Aggadic and Midrashic narratives is intrinsically linked to the prophetic mussar, providing a deeper understanding of their legal and ethical implications. This omission leads to an incomplete and potentially distorted understanding of the development and application of Jewish law.

The Sanhedrin’s power to authorize or deny “voluntary wars” initiated by the king, based on its common law legislative review powers (משנה תורה), is crucial. This demonstrates the Sanhedrin’s role extended beyond mere legal interpretation; it actively shaped national policy. This highlights the dynamic interplay between law, governance, and interpretation within the Jewish tradition, a dynamic that is central to understanding judicial activism in its historical context.

The current debate surrounding judicial reform in Israel directly reflects these historical tensions. The government’s attempts to limit the Supreme Court’s authority echo past struggles over the balance of power between the judiciary and the executive. The framing of the Torah as a written constitution and the Talmud as a model for re-establishing lateral Sanhedrin courtrooms underscores the ongoing relevance of these historical precedents in contemporary discussions.

This “insightful” comparison of Pardes logic with Greek syllogistic or dialectical logic highlights a fundamental difference in legal reasoning. The emphasis on comparison and analogy in Jewish legal thought, as opposed to the categorical and deductive approaches of Greek logic, utterly crucial to understand the fundamental error made by the Rambam’s code of halacha. This difference is not merely academic; it shapes the very nature of Jewish law and its application. It explains the reasons for the Jewish Civil War which witness mass population transfers consequent to Jewish legal anarchy. The concept of “faith as the pursuit of justice,” with Sanhedrin courts providing fair compensation for damages, a distinctly Jewish legal concept, foreign to the legal systems of Gentile civilizations. This fundamental difference underscores the limitations of applying Western legal theories to the analysis of Jewish law.

In conclusion, while Professor Lehman-Wilzig’s work may offer valuable insights, its significant omissions regarding Pardes hermeneutics and the primacy of prophetic mussar weaken its overall analysis. A comprehensive understanding of Jewish judicial activism requires a deeper engagement with these foundational aspects of Jewish legal thought.

Ancient T’NaCH/Talmudic Common Law compared to Modern Israeli Law – Contrasted by the Goy perversion of Jewish Common law

Prof. Sam Lehman-Wilzig’s work on judicial activism in Jewish history and law! It’s a fascinating topic that intersects tradition, governance, and interpretation.

The oral tradition was central to Jewish law for centuries before any written texts emerged. Amazing Prof. Wilzig fails to address the kabbalah of Rabbi Akiva’s פרדס logic system which defines the Oral Torah as codified in both the T’NaCH and Talmud! A herd of rampaging elephants in the China Closet totally ignored!

Just as great an over-sight: the Prof.’s confusion over the essential priority of prophetic mussar over history when learning the T’NaCH and how this Primary Source defines the k’vanna of both Talmudic Aggadah and Gaonic Midrash stories which serve as a primary commentary to the Aggadah.

The Judges of the Great Sanhedrin had the power to authorize or deny a “voluntary war” initiated by the King based upon the Common Law משנה תורה Legislative Review powers of the Court over the king. Their role extended beyond mere legal interpretation; they influenced national decisions.

משנה תורה = Legislative Review. Hence in ancient T’NaCH legalism “theoritically” a Great Sanhedrin court could declare a statute law imposed by the king as an unconstitutional violation of Torah Constitutional Law. This power of משנה תורה emphatically influenced any and all Tribal statute laws of the 12 Tribes of Israel which formed the Republic alliance or brit between the Tribes of Yaacov. Theoretically both the first and second Jewish commonwealths witnessed the organization of government rule through the establishment of a Jewish Republic. Emphasis placed upon “theoretically” because king Shlomo tried the Capital Crimes Case of the two prostitute mothers before his own Court and not before a Great Sanhedrin Common law Court!

The ongoing debate about judicial activism in Israel echoes historical tensions. The government’s attempts at “Judicial Reform” aim to limit the Supreme Court’s authority. The Torah as the Written Constitution of the Republic. The Talmud as the model to re-establish lateral, NOT vertical Common Law Sanhedrin courtrooms.

Rabbi Akiva’s פרדס (Pardes) logic system indeed plays a crucial role in understanding the Oral Torah. Both the T’NaCH Aggadic mussar common law & the Talmud halacha common law stand upon the wisdom of making valid comparisons of different Case studies. Both compilations of mussar & halachic ritual discussions, debates, etc. defines this unique oral Torah tradition.

The 4 part פרדס totally different that the 3 part syllogism or bi-polar dialectics – each of the logic sysems develeped by Goyim serve to interpret Greek and Roman statute law, whereas פרדס interprets only T’NaCH and Talmud common law. Both the logic and law of Goyim legalisms share no common ground with Torah legalism which defines faith as the pursuit of Justice. And justice defined in its turn as: fair compensation of damages imposed by lateral Judicial common law courtrooms.

פרדס logic compares to the Confederate Flag: the Stars and Bars. Where דרוש פשט form a זיוג and רמז סוד form a crossing זיוג. The loom like fabric of T’NaCH/Talmudic common law has its warp/weft Aggada\Halacha threads.

Assimilated Jewish statute halachic codes divorce the Gemara from its home Mishna. The purpose of a sugia of Gemara, to learn to other Primary בנין אב sources both T’NaCH and Talmudic. That’s how Jewish common law learns. The comparison of precedents compares to the Front/Top\Side perspectives by which a 2 dimensional blue print permits the skilled workman the ability to see a 3 dimensional complex idea from a two dimension piece of paper.

טיפש פשט by stark contrast worships words read from books with a strictly literal/physical understanding. An example of such bird-brained stupidity, the idea that שם ומלכות literally means the Inefible Name which the lips of Man cannot pronounce and kingship.

The kabbalah of פרדס depth analysis, this wisdom understands pronouncing the Name through the בנין אב of blowing the Shofar on Rosh HaShanna. While the lungs blow air the spirit within the Yatzir Tov of the heart dedicate Divine Spirits. Tefillah a matter of the heart which requires the k’vanna, as defined through שם ומלכות. Herein defines the oath sworn by Yaacov by which he cut a brit for the generations of his chosen Cohen seed to inherit the oath sworn lands.

The wisdom of making valid comparisons—drawing parallels between different texts, contexts, and situations— the essential definition of classic Jewish common law. It allows for nuanced interpretations, as opposed to literal word translation worship of words. The Aggadic mussar woven into Halachic ritualist discussions, this legal fabric has the power to breath life into the souls of the Jewish people.

Greek logic which organizes into strict catagories simply does not correctly align with Torah common law legalism. Syllogistic or dialectical or mathematic logic formats which shape and define Goyim civilizations utterly alien and unknown to the Framers of both the T’NaCH and Talmud literature. Faith defined as the pursuit of justice wherein Sanhedrin courtrooms impose fair compensation of damages inflict by party A upon party B, completely unknown to Goyim logic formats.

The current discussions around judicial reform in Israel echo historical tensions regarding the balance of power between the judiciary and the legislature. The Torah serves as a Written Constitution highlights the ongoing importance of these ancient texts in shaping modern legal frameworks of משנה תורה ‘Legislative Review’ Common law. The process of making valid comparisons among different texts and cases, indeed the chief cornerstone of Jewish common law. This approach fosters the wisdom of development of a nuanced understanding; which allows for dynamic interpretations that transcend silly, strictly literal reading of texts. Hence the idea: Goyim read their bibles while Jews learn our Torah.

This article seeks to raise several fascinating points about how the unique character of Jewish legal reasoning, grounded in textual comparison and the pursuit of justice, and how it sharply differs from Greco-Roman and other non-Jewish legal frameworks. The ongoing debates in Israel around judicial reform and the balance of power between the courts and the elected government clearly reflect these historical tensions.

The analogy to the Confederate flag, representing the interwoven threads of Aggadah and Halakha, effectively illustrates the complex and interconnected nature of Jewish legal reasoning, a complexity lost when Pardes – ignored. The prioritization of prophetic mussar (ethical teachings) in understanding Tanakh is another crucial element missed. Prophetic mussar provides the ethical framework and underlying principles that inform the interpretation of both Halakha (Jewish law) and Aggadah (narrative and homiletical material). By neglecting this foundational element, the Professor fails to grasp the ethical and moral underpinnings of Jewish law, reducing it to a purely legalistic system. The kavanah (intention) behind Aggadic and Midrashic narratives is intrinsically linked to the prophetic mussar, providing a deeper understanding of their legal and ethical implications. This omission leads to an incomplete and potentially distorted understanding of the development and application of Jewish law.

The Sanhedrin’s power to authorize or deny “voluntary wars” initiated by the king, based on its common law legislative review powers (משנה תורה), is crucial. This demonstrates the Sanhedrin’s role extended beyond mere legal interpretation; it actively shaped national policy. This highlights the dynamic interplay between law, governance, and interpretation within the Jewish tradition, a dynamic that is central to understanding judicial activism in its historical context.

The current debate surrounding judicial reform in Israel directly reflects these historical tensions. The government’s attempts to limit the Supreme Court’s authority echo past struggles over the balance of power between the judiciary and the executive. The framing of the Torah as a written constitution and the Talmud as a model for re-establishing lateral Sanhedrin courtrooms underscores the ongoing relevance of these historical precedents in contemporary discussions.

This “insightful” comparison of Pardes logic with Greek syllogistic or dialectical logic highlights a fundamental difference in legal reasoning. The emphasis on comparison and analogy in Jewish legal thought, as opposed to the categorical and deductive approaches of Greek logic, utterly crucial to understand the fundamental error made by the Rambam’s code of halacha. This difference is not merely academic; it shapes the very nature of Jewish law and its application. It explains the reasons for the Jewish Civil War which witness mass population transfers consequent to Jewish legal anarchy. The concept of “faith as the pursuit of justice,” with Sanhedrin courts providing fair compensation for damages, a distinctly Jewish legal concept, foreign to the legal systems of Gentile civilizations. This fundamental difference underscores the limitations of applying Western legal theories to the analysis of Jewish law.

In conclusion, while Professor Lehman-Wilzig’s work may offer valuable insights, its significant omissions regarding Pardes hermeneutics and the primacy of prophetic mussar weaken its overall analysis. A comprehensive understanding of Jewish judicial activism requires a deeper engagement with these foundational aspects of Jewish legal thought.

משנה תורה\Legislative Review/ achieved through Common law Sanhedrin Courts
https://api.follow.it/track-rss-story-click/v3/M8X-A1uQfqXPRBrWhiodx7JXeTvhTWzl

Prof. Sam Lehman-Wilzig’s work on judicial activism in Jewish history and law! It’s a fascinating topic that intersects tradition, governance, and interpretation.

The oral tradition was central to Jewish law for centuries before any written texts emerged. Amazing Prof. Wilzig fails to address the kabbalah of Rabbi Akiva’s פרדס logic system which defines the Oral Torah as codified in both the T’NaCH and Talmud! A herd of rampaging elephants in the China Closet totally ignored!

Just as great an over-sight: the Prof.’s confusion over the essential priority of prophetic mussar over history when learning the T’NaCH and how this Primary Source defines the k’vanna of both Talmudic Aggadah and Gaonic Midrash stories which serve as a primary commentary to the Aggadah.

The Judges of the Great Sanhedrin had the power to authorize or deny a “voluntary war” initiated by the King based upon the Common Law משנה תורה Legislative Review powers of the Court over the king. Their role extended beyond mere legal interpretation; they influenced national decisions.

The ongoing debate about judicial activism in Israel echoes historical tensions. The government’s attempts at “Judicial Reform” aim to limit the Supreme Court’s authority. The Torah as the Written Constitution of the Republic. The Talmud as the model to re-establish lateral, NOT vertical Common Law Sanhedrin courtrooms.

Rabbi Akiva’s פרדס (Pardes) logic system indeed plays a crucial role in understanding the Oral Torah. Both the T’NaCH Aggadic mussar common law & the Talmud halacha common law stand upon the wisdom of making valid comparisons of different Case studies. Both compilations of mussar & halachic ritual discussions, debates, etc. defines this unique oral Torah tradition.

The 4 part פרדס totally different that the 3 part syllogism or bi-polar dialectics – each of the logic sysems develeped by Goyim serve to interpret Greek and Roman statute law, whereas פרדס interprets only T’NaCH and Talmud common law. Both the logic and law of Goyim legalisms share no common ground with Torah legalism which defines faith as the pursuit of Justice. And justice defined in its turn as: fair compensation of damages imposed by lateral Judicial common law courtrooms.

פרדס logic compares to the Confederate Flag: the Stars and Bars. Where דרוש פשט form a זיוג and רמז סוד form a crossing זיוג. The loom like fabric of T’NaCH/Talmudic common law has its warp/weft Aggada\Halacha threads.

Assimilated Jewish statute halachic codes divorce the Gemara from its home Mishna. The purpose of a sugia of Gemara, to learn to other Primary בנין אב sources both T’NaCH and Talmudic. That’s how Jewish common law learns. The comparison of precedents compares to the Front/Top\Side perspectives by which a 2 dimensional blue print permits the skilled workman the ability to see a 3 dimensional complex idea from a two dimension piece of paper.

טיפש פשט by stark contrast worships words read from books with a strictly literal/physical understanding. An example of such bird-brained stupidity, the idea that שם ומלכות literally means the Inefible Name which the lips of Man cannot pronounce and kingship.

The kabbalah of פרדס depth analysis, this wisdom understands pronouncing the Name through the בנין אב of blowing the Shofar on Rosh HaShanna. While the lungs blow air the spirit within the Yatzir Tov of the heart dedicate Divine Spirits. Tefillah a matter of the heart which requires the k’vanna, as defined through שם ומלכות. Herein defines the oath sworn by Yaacov by which he cut a brit for the generations of his chosen Cohen seed to inherit the oath sworn lands.

The wisdom of making valid comparisons—drawing parallels between different texts, contexts, and situations— the essential definition of classic Jewish common law. It allows for nuanced interpretations, as opposed to literal word translation worship of words. The Aggadic mussar woven into Halachic ritualist discussions, this legal fabric has the power to breath life into the souls of the Jewish people.

Greek logic which organizes into strict catagories simply does not correctly align with Torah common law legalism. Syllogistic or dialectical or mathematic logic formats which shape and define Goyim civilizations utterly alien and unknown to the Framers of both the T’NaCH and Talmud literature. Faith defined as the pursuit of justice wherein Sanhedrin courtrooms impose fair compensation of damages inflict by party A upon party B, completely unknown to Goyim logic formats.

The current discussions around judicial reform in Israel echo historical tensions regarding the balance of power between the judiciary and the legislature. The Torah serves as a Written Constitution highlights the ongoing importance of these ancient texts in shaping modern legal frameworks of משנה תורה ‘Legislative Review’ Common law. The process of making valid comparisons among different texts and cases, indeed the chief cornerstone of Jewish common law. This approach fosters the wisdom of development of a nuanced understanding; which allows for dynamic interpretations that transcend silly, strictly literal reading of texts. Hence the idea: Goyim read their bibles while Jews learn our Torah.

This article seeks to raise several fascinating points about how the unique character of Jewish legal reasoning, grounded in textual comparison and the pursuit of justice, and how it sharply differs from Greco-Roman and other non-Jewish legal frameworks. The ongoing debates in Israel around judicial reform and the balance of power between the courts and the elected government clearly reflect these historical tensions.

The analogy to the Confederate flag, representing the interwoven threads of Aggadah and Halakha, effectively illustrates the complex and interconnected nature of Jewish legal reasoning, a complexity lost when Pardes – ignored. The prioritization of prophetic mussar (ethical teachings) in understanding Tanakh is another crucial element missed. Prophetic mussar provides the ethical framework and underlying principles that inform the interpretation of both Halakha (Jewish law) and Aggadah (narrative and homiletical material). By neglecting this foundational element, the Professor fails to grasp the ethical and moral underpinnings of Jewish law, reducing it to a purely legalistic system. The kavanah (intention) behind Aggadic and Midrashic narratives is intrinsically linked to the prophetic mussar, providing a deeper understanding of their legal and ethical implications. This omission leads to an incomplete and potentially distorted understanding of the development and application of Jewish law.

The Sanhedrin’s power to authorize or deny “voluntary wars” initiated by the king, based on its common law legislative review powers (משנה תורה), is crucial. This demonstrates the Sanhedrin’s role extended beyond mere legal interpretation; it actively shaped national policy. This highlights the dynamic interplay between law, governance, and interpretation within the Jewish tradition, a dynamic that is central to understanding judicial activism in its historical context.

The current debate surrounding judicial reform in Israel directly reflects these historical tensions. The government’s attempts to limit the Supreme Court’s authority echo past struggles over the balance of power between the judiciary and the executive. The framing of the Torah as a written constitution and the Talmud as a model for re-establishing lateral Sanhedrin courtrooms underscores the ongoing relevance of these historical precedents in contemporary discussions.

This “insightful” comparison of Pardes logic with Greek syllogistic or dialectical logic highlights a fundamental difference in legal reasoning. The emphasis on comparison and analogy in Jewish legal thought, as opposed to the categorical and deductive approaches of Greek logic, utterly crucial to understand the fundamental error made by the Rambam’s code of halacha. This difference is not merely academic; it shapes the very nature of Jewish law and its application. It explains the reasons for the Jewish Civil War which witness mass population transfers consequent to Jewish legal anarchy. The concept of “faith as the pursuit of justice,” with Sanhedrin courts providing fair compensation for damages, a distinctly Jewish legal concept, foreign to the legal systems of Gentile civilizations. This fundamental difference underscores the limitations of applying Western legal theories to the analysis of Jewish law.

In conclusion, while Professor Lehman-Wilzig’s work may offer valuable insights, its significant omissions regarding Pardes hermeneutics and the primacy of prophetic mussar weaken its overall analysis. A comprehensive understanding of Jewish judicial activism requires a deeper engagement with these foundational aspects of Jewish legal thought.